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Man and Creation according to the Religious Tradition of Judaism
Manfred Vogel

 

In the religious discourse, certainly in the religious discourse of biblical faiths, the term "creation" stands for the notion of the world or, even more specifically, for the notion of nature — creation is nature. This being the case, the title of this paper actually suggests that we are to deal with man and nature, or to put it even more explicitly, it proposes that we examine the relation of man to nature in the context of the religious tradition of Judaism. The issue before us here, then, is to ascertain what kind of relation between man and nature is feasible in terms of the structure of faith of Judaism.'

Before entering, however, into our discussion of this issue it may be significant to observe that the relation of man to nature does not stand at the very core of the religious structure of Judaism. This is so because nature does not occupy a central place in the religious drama of Judaism. The religious drama of Judaism does not take place between man and nature; it takes place between man and his fellow-man. In other words, the predicament and commensurate to this the salvation are anchored in the social dimension and not in nature, and correspondingly, therefore, God is encountered primarily not in nature but in history (seeing that it is history and not nature which is constituted by the social, political and economic relations between man and his fellow-man). Thus, it is history and not nature which constitutes the matrix in which the religious drama unfolds. In brief, Judaism is not a "nature religion". Still, in as much as the religious drama of Judaism is by its very essence this-worldly, nature of necessity enters the "picture". It is the inescapable stage (though not the matrix!) on which the religious drama — played between man and his fellow-man, between man and God, in the matrix of history — takes place. The this-worldly aspect of Judaism necessitates the presence of nature. But nature is present (and this is all that the this-worldly aspect of Judaism would require) only as background, as the passive agent bearing and suffering the action of man and God! Nonetheless, in as much as nature is present, even though its role is passive and contingent on man's action, the issue of man's relation to nature does arise and demand a response from the religious tradition of Judaism.

In trying to determine and explicate the stance that Judaism takes with regard to the issue of man's relation to nature the primary and all-important question is: What kind of being is attributed to nature? This question bears heavily on the issue before us in as much as the answer to it will fundamentally determine the kind of relation that is feasible vis-a-vis nature and, indeed, will provide the "key" to the inner logic that operates and determines the stance that Judaism takes as regards man's relation to nature. We would suggest that in answering this question we are in essence confronted with the alternative of two (and only two) qualitatively different kinds of being. We are confronted with the alternative between a personal being, a being endowed with awareness, a being that is the expression of Consciousness, i.e., a being-of-Consciousness, on the one hand, and an impersonal being, a being devoid of awareness, a being that is the expression of blind Power, i.e., a being-of-Power, on the other hand. Using Buberian terminology as a short-hand, we would say that we are confronted with the unbridgeable alternative between an It-being and a Thou-being.

I - THou vs. I-IT

Now, this ontological bifurcation clearly implicates, in turn, the relational, behavioral bifurcation described by Buber in terms of the I-It and the I-Thou relations. For evidently vis-a-vis an impersonal being-of-Power the only relation feasible is a relation of utilization and manipulation; one can relate to a being-of-Power only as an object (an object as an ontological, not a grammatical, category), only as a means to some further end. In short, the only relation that is feasible here is the I-It relation. This is so in as much as the relation here is of necessity a transaction in blind power and such a transaction inescapably implicates utilization and manipulation; such a transaction is inescapably caught in an unending network of causation. As against this, vis-a-vis a personal being-of-Consciousness the only relation feasible is a relation of address and affirmation; one can relate to a being-of-Consciousness only as a subject (here again, a subject as an ontological, not a grammatical, category), only as an end in-itself. Here, the only relation that is feasible is the I-Thou relation. This is so in as much as the relation here is a transaction in consciousness — an act of the confirmation of being and the bestowal of meaningfulness — and such a transaction implicates exlusively the mere presence of consciousness and its address to the others as an end in-itself. Thus, a being constituted as an It-being of necessity implicates a relation towards itself that is qualitatively and radically different from the relation which a being constituted as a Thou would of necessity implicate towards itself. A Thou-being would of necessity implicate an I-Thou relation towards itself and correspondingly an It-being would of necessity implicate an I-It relation towards itself. For it simply would not make sense to relate to a being-of-Power in an I-Thou relation (it simply would not make sense to address a being devoid of consciousness), nor would it be feasible to relate to a being-of-Consciousness in an I-It relation without, in so doing, reducing the beingof-Consciousness to an It-being. Thus, the kind of being attributed to nature wauld determine the kind of relation that is feasible towards it.3

There is one further consideration that is implicated by this ontological bifurcation of an It-being and a Thou-being to which we must turn briefly as it is of special significance to our topic here. Namely, the ontological bifurcation of an It-being and a Thou-being not only determines the kind of relation that is feasible, it also determines whether accountability and responsibility can be exacted. We would want to contend that an It-being can neither exact accountability and responsibility for action directed towards itself nor can it be held accountable and responsible for the action it directs towards other beings. Accountability and responsibility make sense and are feasible only in the context of the relations, the actions, between Thou-beings; they do not make sense and are not feasible in the context of the relations, the actions, between It-beings. For to exact responsibility for action directed towards oneself, i.e., to challenge an other with regards to its action towards oneself, requires that the recipient of the action be a being endowed with consciousness, i.e., a Thou-being. A being devoid of consciousness, i.e., an It-being, cannot question, leave alone, challenge. Thus, for example, it simply would not make sense and, indeed, would not be feasible to suppose that a rock can challenge me for having hit it, saying in effect, "Why did you do this to me? You should not have done this." And to be a bearer of responsibility, i.e., to be answerable for one's actions, requires that the agent who is the subject of the action be free, i.e., capable of having acted differently.' Such freedom to act differently is available, however, only to a being endowed with consciousness, i.e., a Thou-being. For only in the context of Consciousness is there spontaneity and choice; in the context of Power there is only causality and determinism. A being devoid of consciousness, an It-being, is therefore inextricably caught in a network of deterministic causality and cannot be held responsible for its actions. Thus, to use the example of the rock again, it would not make sense to hold responsible for its actions a rock that fell and killed an innocent child. It would not make sense to say to the rock, "This is despicable; you should not have done it." Only a being endowed with consciousness, i.e., a Thou-being, can challenge the action directed towards itself exacting accountability from its perpetrator; and likewise, only a being endowed with consciousness, i.e., a Thou-being, is a free agent (in the sense of having the capacity to have acted differently) and consequently responsible for its actions towards others. With regard to a being devoid of consciousness, i.e., an It-being (a being-of-Power), the notions of accountability and responsibility simply do not make sense.

MAN AND NATURE: I-IT

Now, in terms of this ontological bifurcation between the It-being and the Thou-being and the kind of relation they respectively implicate with regard to themselves, we can now proceed to answer the two basic questions posed above, namely, what kind of being does Judaism attribute to nature and, corresponding to this, what kind of relation does nature implicate with regard to itself. We would submit that the answer to the first question is quite definite and unambiguous — Judaism (though quite obviously not expressing itself in our terminology) views nature as being constituted as an It-being. For clearly nature is not viewed as a being endowed with consciousness; it is not seen as a personal being' Very poignantly and in clear contra-distinction to man, nature is not characterized as a bearer of the divine image. Indeed, not only is nature not a bearer of the divine image, i.e., constituted in itself as a Thou-being, it also does not serve as an abode for the divine, i.e., for a Thou-being. The divine does not dwell in nature; he may encounter, man through the agency of nature here and there as, for example, in the burning bush, but he does not reside permanently in any part of nature. Here, indeed, lies the very reason for the observation above that Judaism is not a "nature religion". For the very essence of "nature religion" is that the divine does reside permanently in one or another part of nature; in as much as it is precisely this that is excluded in the structure of faith of Judaism, Judaism is not a "nature religion". Thus, in Judaism nature is desacralized from the very start in as much as it is never sacralized to begin with (sacralized, of course, in the sense of being constituted as a divine being or as a permanent abode for the divine being). But the divine being implicated in the discussion here is clearly divine by virtue of being a Thou-being and this, therefore, means that in Judaism nature from the very start is not constituted as a Thou-being or, to put the point in the affirmative, that from the very start and by its very essence nature in Judaism is constituted as an It-being.5 Indeed, the description above of the role assigned to nature in the structure of faith of Judaism, namely, the passive role of serving as the stage and background to the religious drama (which drama is carried out in terms of the encounter between man and God), clearly corresponds to and reflects our contention that nature is viewed in Judaism as being constituted as an It-being.

But this, in turn, means that in this context man's relation to nature must be an I-It relation. For nature constituted as an It-being would of necessity implicate an I-It relation towards itself, namely, it would of necessity implicate towards itself a relation of utilization and manipulation, a relation in which nature cannot exact accountability and responsibility for the action directed towards itself. We would contend that this is indeed the case in Judaism. The relation of man towards nature is essentially seen as being at its core an I-It relation which thus allows the utilization and manipulation of nature. Indeed, this is clearly and explicitly expressed in Genesis 1:28-30 and in Genesis 9:2-3. Man is given dominion and rule over nature to utilize and manipulate it for his needs. True, it would not be legitimate to resolve such an issue on the basis of one or two references. No doubt, in such an old and rich tradition as Judaism, one could find references to support practically any conceivable view. Still, Genesis 1:28-30 and Genesis 9:2-3 are the only references where the relation is delineated with respect to the totality of nature rather than with respect to any particular class of entities within nature. Furthermore, they are placed in a covenantal framework clearly indicating that they are meant to be taken as the basic normative delineation of man's relation to nature; indeed, in the rabbinic-halakhic tradition they were taken as the normative source providing the basic guidelines for the tradition's more detailed formulation of the relationship. Thus, these passages in Genesis can be taken as the locus classicus for the delineation of man's relation towards nature, and quite clearly the delineation encountered here is of an I-It relation6.

CREATION "EX NIHILO"

But this is not the whole story. While we would want to contend that nature is indeed constituted as an It-being and therefore the relation to it can only be an I-It relation (the possibility of an I-Thou relation being definitely excluded), this I-It relation, however, is significantly circumscribed in Judaism. This circumscription is introduced by the tenet of Creation, i.e., by the fact that nature is viewed as a created being. Namely, the circumscription is introduced not by impinging on the ontological constitution of nature but by impinging

upon its status. Nature remains constituted as an It-being but its status is that of a created It-being. Here, in the last analysis, lies the true signification of the tenet of creation for Judaism. Indeed, this is clearly seen in the fact that the tenet of creation formulates itself in Judaism as creatio ex nihilo and that it is specifically as such that is assumes its importance and centrality in the structure of faith of Judaism. For Judaism creation signifies creatio ex nihilo and the signification of creatio ex nihilo clearly impinges on the question of the status of nature (in as much as its signification is to assert that the being of nature is not eternal and therefore not coeval with the divine or, to put it in the affirmative, that the being of nature is contingent and dependent).

It must be admitted, however, that it is not all that clear that the formulation of the tenet of creation as creatio ex nihilo finds explicit expression prior to the middle ages. Thus, for example, it is dubious whether a formulation of creatio ex nihilo is actually expressed in the Bible. Certainly, those passages describing God's battle with the primordial tanin or with some other primordial animals 7 do not bear a view of creation as creatio ex nihilo. These passages are clearly remnants, albeit truncated and impoverished by the monotheistic refraction, of the rich and imposing myths of creation found in ancient Sumer, Babylon, Assyria and Ugarit, and these myths by their very essence exlude creatio ex nihilo. Indeed, if anything, these passages, far from intimating a creatio ex nihilo, clearly exclude such view. They clearly suggest the presence of a primordial being, e.g., the tanin, of whose body the world, i.e., nature, is created, and this is simply not compatible with creatio ex nihilo. Evidently, these passages would not support the claim of creatio ex nihilo.

Nor would those passages where the monotheistic refraction is more thorough support, in the last analysis, the claim of creatio ex nihilo. One has in mind those passages in which God is represented as placing the corner-stone of the world with the angels singing, or in which God is represented as measuring the water and the mountains and stretching the heavens above, Here, the more thorough monotheistic refraction is clearly seen in the absence of a primordial, coeval divine being thus leaving God as the sole actor in the act of creation. Evidently, these passages are more congenial to the monotheistic view-point as they eliminate any rival divine beings. But what about the view of creation as creatio ex nihilo? Here, it is not at all clear that these passages implicate a view of creatio ex nihilo. If anything, they seem to implicate the pre-existence of the water, the mountains and the heavens prior to God's creative acts, i.e., prior to his acts of measuring and stretching. Indeed, it would seem that the view of creation emerging from these passages is patterned after the model of the artisan creating, i.e., fashioning, his artifact, and such a view certainly excludes a creatio ex nihilo. In any event, these passages are really but fleeting references to creation and do not yield much substance that impinges on the question before us regarding the status of nature.

CREATION ACCOUNT IN GENESIS

The main source in biblical literature that impinges on the question before us regarding the status of nature is of course the creation narrative in the opening chapter of Genesis (Gen 1-2:7).9 Any determination of whether or not the view of creatio ex nihilo is reflected in the Bible must devolve on this account. Now this narration too, in all probability, is a truncated remnant of the creation epic current in the ancient Near East. It is however in contra-distinction particularly to the references of God's battle with the primordial animal mentioned above, much more thoroughly refracted by the monotheistic viewpoint. The monotheistic hallmark of the refraction of this narration lies in the fact that creation here is brought about through the sole agency of God's word. Thus, the creation story in the opening chapter of Genesis is not only the most substantial treatment of our subject in biblical literature, but it is also the treatment that is most thoroughly refracted by the monotheistic viewpoint .10

The burden of the narrative here, however, is on the "how" question, namely, the narration deals in the main with how the world, i.e., nature, in its various parts is constituted, and this unfortunately does not impinge on the issue that concerns us." What concerns us is the "what" question, namely, what kind of being, what status is accorded to nature in the scheme of things. In its original setting, i.e., in its status as a full-fledged myth in the context of paganism, the "how" may indeed have been the main intention and thrust of the myth of creation. In the context of paganism myth may indeed serve as a pseudo-science, and thus it is to be expected that the myth of creation would undertake to account for how the world, i.e., nature, in its various parts was constituted. But in the context of the distinctive biblical faith, the scientific concern, i.e., the concern with the "how," is not the real concern or indeed even a legitimate concern. Here, the religious concern cannot be identified with the scientific concern; the religious concern impinges mainly (one is tempted to say exclusively) on the "what" question, i.e., what kind of being, what status, does nature possess.

In \as much, however, as the Genesis narrative, despite its monotheistic refraction, continues to dwell largely on the "how" question and does not address itself explicitly to the "what" question, the answer to the "what" question can be ascertained only through inference. It is interesting that the pronouncement which suggests itself for such inference is the pronouncement which affects the monotheistic refraction, namely, the monotonously repetitive formula "And God said let there be . . . and it was so." According to this formula, nature is brought into existence by the mere agency of God's speech. This may suggest the view of creatio ex nihilo — prior to God's speech there is nothing. Indeed, later tradition was inclined to understand the signification of this formula in this way. But the Genesis narrative, taken in its own terms, does not really state this. A careful reading clearly shows that what is brought into existence by the mere agency of God's speech are the particular entities of nature but not the very being of nature itself, i.e., the matter of which these particular entities are constituted. The formula does not exclude the pre-existence of some primordial matter out of which the specific entities of nature are fashioned and brought into existence by the agency of God's speech. Indeed, the opening of the Genesis account would seem to support precisely such a state of affairs — the pre-existence of some primordial being or beings. Genesis 1:2 taken literally and in its own terms would seem to suggest the existence prior to the act of creation of a body of primordial water, of darkness (which, by the way, is not mentioned subsequently as being created), and of tohu and vohu. Furthermore, if Genesis 1:1 reading "In the beginning God created" (thus suggesting a creatio ex nihilo view which indeed was widely utilized by the later tradition to support its claim that the view of creatio ex nihilo is already expressed in the Bible) is by mere change of vocalization emended to read "When God was initially creating", as indeed it seems the text should read, then we have here an adverbial clause clearly suggesting a creation in time which, in turn, implicates an existence of matter prior to the act of creation and consequently the absence of a creatio ex nihilo view." Thus, a critical reading of the Genesis narrative in its own terms would not support the claim the the narrative reflects a creatio ex nihilo view. Indeed, if anything, the narrative here suggests once again a notion of creation that is modeled after the artisan fashioning his artifact (a model that dearly excludes the view of creatio ex nihilo). The only distinction of the Genesis narrative lies in the fact that here the act of creation is in a sense "spiritualized" in as much as the creation, i.e., the fashioning, of the artifact is not by concrete, mechanical action but by pure speech alone." But the signification of this "spiritualization" implicated by the notion of creation by speech alone impinges on the aspect of the creator, i.e., on the question of what kind of God is implicated in the creation here, rather than on the aspect of the created, i.e., on the question of creatio ex nihilo. Thus, this notion of creation by speech alone further strengthens the already thorough monotheistic refraction characterizing the Genesis narrative. It does not, however, implicate a view of creation as creatio ex nihilo.

CREATION IN OTHER BIBLICAL LITERATURE

The further expression of the creation motif in biblical literature, i.e., its expression in the Davidic royal theology, in wisdom literature and in later prophecy, does not essentially change the picture as regards the issue before us. That is, the various expressions of the creation motif in these sources do not imply, let alone state explicitly, a view of creation as creatio ex nihilo. Indeed, the signification given to the notion of creation here is a signification that is commonly met in the creation myths of paganism. Creation signifies here the introduction of order into chaos; it is the establishment of order into what previously was chaos, the molding of chaos into cosmos. As such the signification here clearly excludes a creatio ex nihilo view. For it suggests a creation that reflects the model of the artisan fashioning his artifact and commensurate with this it suggests the pre-existence of matter prior to creation 14

What is of special significance, however, in these expressions is the fact that creation thus understood, i.e., understood as the transformation of chaos into order, is applied here not in the metaphysical domain but in the historical and ethical domains (Davidic royal theology and prophecy apply it in the historical domain while wisdom literature applies it in the ethical domain). Namely, the creation motif is articulated here not with regard to its metaphysical implications but rather with regard to its historical and ethical implications. Thus, Davidic royal theology, in order to establish the firmness and eternity of God's covenant with the House of David, links this covenant with the primary covenant of creation whereby an ordered world is established out of chaos. "The royal theologians in Jerusalem laid the foundations of the Davidic dynasty in firmer soil than in the problematic and conditional grounds of the Mosaic covenant. . . . This invited God's eternal commitment to the dynasty of David, a commitment as firmly established as God's creation of an ordered world."15 Prophecy (especially deutero-Isaiah) likewise links creation, again seen as signifying the establishment of order, i.e., as the slaying of Rahab representing chaos, with the succeeding mighty acts of God such as the dividing of the sea of reeds, the conquest of Canaan, and the new exodus from Babylonian captivity about to take place." Creation is but the first redemptive act of God; it is but the first event in the consequent succession of redemptive events constituting the heilsgeschichte.17 The creative and the redemptive are linked together: "Creator and Savior or Redeemer are one and the same God." 18 Lastly, in wisdom literature where the concern is with "practical, prudential, moral knowledge of what is best for daily life", creation, which is seen here too as the establishment of order, provides the guarantee for the possibility of the ethical life. "This world is created in such a way that man can have confidence that the ethical life is rooted in the very creation itself.19

Clearly, creation is converted here from a metaphysical category to an ethical or historical category. This indeed reflects the basic posture of biblical thought — deep involvement in the historical and ethical domains but hardly any concern with the metaphysical domain. This absence of interest in the metaphysical domain is distinctive of biblical thought, and it is most significant for our consideration here as it bears heavily on the biblical handling of the creation motif. Thus, it may well account for the lack of explicit concern in biblical thought with the question of creatio ex nihilo. For the question of creatio ex nihilo versus the existence of coeval matter is a thoroughly metaphysical question and as such it can arise only in a context of metaphysical concern. Indeed, it may also acconut for the lack of sensitivity in biblical thought to the borrowed elements of pagan creation mythology which imply a view of creation that excludes creatio ex nihilo as, for example, the view of creation that is patterned after the model of the artisan fashioning his artifact, or the view of creation as the establishment of order out of chaos. True, their views exlude the creatio ex nihilo view clearly and explicitly only when their signification is articulated in the metaphysical context, as indeed is the case in paganism,2° and in the Bible they are not articulated in the metaphysical context. Still, these views when not articulated in the metaphysical context do continue nonetheless to exclude the creatio ex nihilo view, though now only implicitly, and yet the Bible is tolerant of them. This is all the more remarkable when compared to the jealousy which the Bible manifests with regards to those borrowings from pagan mythology which impinge on the monotheistic aspect. Here, the biblical tendency is clearly to refract the pagan borrowings so as to remove any allusion that may compromise the monotheistic aspect. That the Bible is not equally sensitive to the aspect of creatio ex nihilo and thus does not refract with equal zeal the pagan borrowings impinging upon it can be accounted for only on the basis that biblical thought is not metaphysically oriented. Thus, it is because of this lack of metaphysical orientation that biblical thought, as we have seen, does not articulate the signification of its tenet of creation in the metaphysical domain (articulating it rather in the historical and ethical domains), and that consequently it can avoid dealing explicitly with the aspect of creatio ex nihilo. Moreover, this lack of metaphysical orientation desensitizes biblical thought to the implicit negation of a creatio ex nihilo view which is contained in its borrowings from the pagan, creation myths. Their half-way "neutralization" or "suppression" due to the fact that the tenet of creation is articulated in the historical and ethical rather than in the metaphysical domain, seems sufficient for biblical thought, so that a more thorough refraction to eliminate this implicit negation of a creatio ex nihilo view is not undertaken by it.

And yet when the metaphysical aspect is, so to speak, forced from the outside upon the Bible, the biblical response, now impinging much more dearly on the metaphysical aspect, is quite suggestive of a creatio ex nihilo view. True, we have only one instance that exemplifies this. It is to be found in deutero-Isaiah 45:7 where the prophet declares that God created not only light but also darkness (thus supplementing a glowing omission in the Genesis account, namely, the omission of the creation of darkness). This declaration is clearly metaphysical in its signification and as such it of course impinges on the issue of creatio ex nihilo. Indeed, the declaration here is very suggestive of affirming a creatio ex nihilo view in as much as it clearly negates the pre-existence of a being other than God, i.e., in as much as it negates the pre-existence of darkness as a primordial, coeval being with God. But it seems quite dear that this declaration by deutero-Isaiah is precipitated as a reaction against dualistic formulations which in all probability used the omission in the Genesis account as a telling point in their arsenal of argumentation. Thus, deutero-Isaiah provides us with an instance where a creatio ex nihilo view is strongly suggested, but this instance is provided only because the issue is precipitated from the outside. When confronted with a dualistic formulation, deutero-Isaiah articulates the creation motif in the metaphysical context and, indeed, in a way that is congenial to the creatio ex nihilo view.

Still, even though deutero-Isaiah is the sole instance that articulates a view that is dearly suggestive of creatio ex nihilo, it may be taken nonetheless as reflecting what ought to be the tendency of biblical thought. For a case can be made that in spite of all that was said above, the thrust of biblical thought by its very inner logic ought to tend towards a view of creation that would implicate a creatio ex nihilo. This is so in as much as the negation of a creatio ex nihilo view may be taken as impinging negatively on the monotheistic aspect. That is, the negation of the creatio ex nihilo view may well suggest the existence of more than one divine being — divine in the specific sense of being an absolute, i.e., a non-dependent, non-contingent being?' For clearly the negation of the creatio ex nihilo view necessarily implicates the existence of another primordial coeval being beside the being of God. It thus necessarily establishes the existence of two absolute, i.e., divine, beings and as such, it clearly impinges negatively on the monotheistic aspect. It should be noted, however, that this conclusion that biblical thought ought to affirma creatio ex nihilo view is not derived from a direct consideration of the tenet of creation. Rather it is derived from the consideration of the monotheistic aspect — it follows as an implication of the monotheistic aspect. Thus, the conclusion arrived at here in no way alters the observation made above that biblical thought is not concerned with the philosophical-metaphysical dimension. The basic, central concern of biblical thought remains focused on the religious signification of the monotheistic aspect and not on the philosophical-metaphysical signification of the creatio ex nihilo formulation. Indeed, biblical thought remains so unphilosophically and unmetaphysically oriented that this implication of the monotheistic aspect (namely, that the safeguarding of the monotheistic aspect in its specific signification of divinity as absolute being implicates the affirmation of a creatio ex nihilo view) is not apparently grasped within biblical thought itself.22 Biblical thought does not seem to be aware of this implication and consequently not only does it not explicitly affirm a creatio ex nihilo view but it seems to tolerate the negation, albeit an implicit negation, of a creatio ex nihilo view.

CREATION IN THE TALMUD

When one moves now from examining biblical thought to the examining of talmudic literature one can encounter some opening towards the metaphysical domain.23 One would expect, therefore, to encounter here a more explicit discussion and formulation with regard to the issue of creatio ex nihilo, seeing that this issue is a metaphysical issue, an issue that one would expect to arise in the context of metaphysical concern and discussion. This, however, does not seem to be the case. For part of the rabbinic discussions regarding the tenet of creation, in similarity to the biblical narration, revolves around the "how" of creation. The biblical account clearly lends itself to such speculations as it is rather laconic in its description, leaving out many of the details regarding the "how" of creation. Particularly for the rabbis who studied the text so carefully and thoroughly (for whom every word, every letter, its sound, its spelling, its location, had special signification to convey), and who had a penchant for detail and precision, the biblical account provided fertile ground for speculation with regard to the "how" of creation. Thus, for example, we have such speculation reflected in the controversy between the school of Shammai and the school of Hillel as to whether the heaven or the earth was created first (according to Rabbi Shimon Bar Yohai the two were created simultaneously);" or, again, we have it reflected in the controversy between the two schools whereby the school of Shammai are saying that the thought was at night and the deed during the day, while the school of Hillel are saying that both thought and deed are during the day (with Shimon Bar Yohai maintaining that thought is both during day time and at night, while the deed is confined merely to sunset) .25 Such reflections, interesting as they may be with regard to some other issues, evidently do not impinge upon our concern here, i.e., upon the issue of creatio ex nihilo.

Of course, there is also considerable amount of reflection on the part of the rabbis that impinges more substantively on the metaphysical dimension of the tenet of creation. However, the main concern in these discussions seems to be the issue of dualism. This is understandable in as much as gnostic dualism constitutes at this juncture the challenge to Judaism from the surrounding environment. Indeed, it cannot be denied that traces of its infiltration into the thought-world of the rabbis can be detected in the literature. Thus, already in the tannaitic period we have, for example, the story of Rabbi Simeon ben Zoma and Rabbi Joshua ben Hananiah which although very obscure and difficult to interpret, nonetheless would seem to convey gnostic dualistic speculations on the part of ben Zoma." We can also see the concern with dualistic interpretations of Scripture in the discussion between Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Akiva regarding the first verse in Genesis, which the gnostics apparently interpreted to say that heaven and earth were co-creators rather than crested beings?' Similarly, the fact that the creation of darkness is not mentioned in the Genesis account gave rise apparently to dualistic interpretations with the rather weak response from the rabbis that on this point there is no solution. This mythological dualistic infiltration would seem to have increased with the onset of the amoraic period; it seems to find expression in the literature much more freely and openly. Thus, for example, in a number of stories an independent status prior to creation is given to a "prince of the sea" or to a "prince of darkness"; the existence prior to creation of other elements such as fire, water (or snow), tohu and vohu is also mentioned." And of course we have the celebrated reference to the pre-existence of the Torah serving as a blueprint which God, on the analogy of an architect, consulted in creating the world.29

Still, the burden of the rabbinic view is to reject the gnostic dualistic view. The very presence of references to dualistic views is often due to the fact that they are mentioned in order to be rejected.3° Thus, the most that can be said is that the dualistic alternative was known to the rabbis and was sufficiently of a challenge at that time so that it could not be ignored; it had to be confronted, and this is precisely what the rabbis do — they bring into the open the dualistic versions in order to reject them (either in an outright manner or through interpreting them so as to remove the dualistic rub). Indeed, in the very instances where such dualistic views may be suspected (in the examples mentioned above as well as in other instances), their unequivocal rejection is also stated. Thus, for example, in the ben Zoma story Rabbi Joshua ben Hananiah rejects vigorously any interpretation that has any inkling to the gnostic view, and Rav (in whose name may stories having a mythological-dualistic flavor are brought) interprets away the gnostic-dualistic reading of the creation account.31 The mainstream position of the rabbis is opposed to the gnostic-dualistic view. Their position is perhaps best summed up in their comment on Isaiah 44:25 explaining the end of the verse "who is with me" to say "who was a partner with me in the work of creation?" 32 The basic idea of the rabbis was always that God alone created everything.

But the question of dualism does not really impinge on the very crux of the subject that is before us, i.e., on the question of creatio ex nihilo. For, strictly speaking, the question of dualism refers to the aspect of the creator, i.e., to the divine — did God have partners in the work of creation or did he create all by himself? On the other hand, the formulation of creatio ex nihilo refers to the aspect of the created, i.e., to the substance of the world — was the created world merely formed of a pre-existing coeval substance or was the very substance of the created world brought into being by the act of creation? True, both the negation of creatio ex nihilo and the dualistic formulation impinge negatively on the monotheistic view-point in that both provide a coeval being beside God in the act of creation. As such, both formulations are pernicious to the monotheistic view-point, and it is understandable that very often the two formulations will be presented and dealt with interchangeably in the literature.33 Still, a distinction is present whereby dualism formulates itself in the domain of the creator while the negation of creatio ex nihilo formulates itself in the domain of the created (in the sense of being merely formed).34 But if dualism does not impinge directly and unambiguously on the issue of creatio ex nihilo, the question of primordial matter clearly does. Quite evidently, the affirmation of primordial matter necessarily negates the formulation of creatio ex nihilo and, vice versa, its negation necessarily implicates the formulation; indeed, the question of primordial matter is the question of creatio ex nihilo. Thus, if we want to know the position of the rabbis with regard to the formulation of creatio ex nihilo, we must attempt to determine what they have to say specifically about the question of primordial matter.

But talmudic literature is not too helpful in this regard. There are really very few references that impinge on the question of primordial matter. And the treatment of the question in most of these references (with one notable exception) is certainly not explicit and clear-cut. As was the case with regard to biblical thought, one must therefore resort also here to inference. Thus, for example, we find Rav mentioning the creation of time in his enumeration of the ten things created on the first day;" since, as we have seen above, the existence of matter would necessarily implicate the existence of time, the statement by Rav necessarily implies that matter was not in existence prior to the first day (for if it were, time too would have been in existence prior to the first day). In other words, it necessarily implies the absence of primordial matter." Or, in a discussion as to whether light or darkness was created first," Rabbi Nehemiah (following Rabbi Ishmael's methodology of interpretation) declares that the whole world was created on the first day,38 which again may be taken to imply the negation of primordial matter. True, there are also some references which may be taken to imply the affirmation of primordial matter. Thus, for example, the story about ben Zoma mentioned above would seem to indicate that ben Zoma was implying the existence of primordial matter;" and the declaration "there is no solution" with regard to the question of the creation of darkness (Tamid 32-1) would also seem to allow the alternative of the existence of primordial matter. But such clues indicating possible affirmation of primordial matter would seem to come only from a few peripheral quarters indulging in such esoteric speculations under the influence of the outside environment. The burden of the rabbinic view, however, seems to negate the existence of primordial matter and thus to imply creatio ex nihilo.

The position certainly expresses itself explicitly and clearly when the rabbis are challenged by views denying creatio ex nihilo. Thus, not only do we have the answer of Rabbi Yehoshua to ben Zoma's intimations regarding the existence of primordial matter (mentioned above), we have the much clearer and more decisive encounter between Rabban Gamaliel and a philosopher. A philosopher told Rabban Gamaliel, "Your God is a ,great artist but he certainly found good materials that helped him", to which Rabban Gamaliel asked, "What are they?" and the philosopher replied, "tohu, vohu, darkness, water, wind and the depths"; to which Rabban Gamaliel responded with a curse saying with regard to all of them "creation" is written." There can be no question that Rabban Gamaliel rejects most forcefully and unequivocally the existence of any primordial matter. And this answer would seem to reflect in the main the position of the rabbis although, as said above, it must be admitted that on their own, when not challenged from the outside, the rabbis do not enter into the philosophical-metaphysical speculations which the creation narrative so clearly suggests. Their speculations stick rather closely to the scriptural text, 41 dwelling on the finer particulars of the "how" of creation and not going beyond the text to its metaphysical implications. Specifically on the matter of creatio ex nihilo, they remain by and large silent. It has been suggested that the rabbinic silence on creatio ex nihilo is due to the fact that the tenet was so firmly accepted that it was taken for granted and therefore not much discussion ensued.42 This observation may have some truth in it; it is certainly difficult to argue from silence. In any event, it would seem to us that the important consideration is to be found in the fact that the rabbis on their own have no disposition to enter metaphysical speculation (following in this respect the biblical example). Indeed, we have any number of statements enjoining us not to enter or pursue such speculation. Thus, one is not to inquire into what was prior to the creation of the world, what is above and what is below, what is before and what is after the world; and any one looking into these four things (i.e., the domains of mystical-metaphysical speculation) deserves not to come into the world.43 One has no business with the mysteries of the world and is not to pursue what is beyond human grasp. The business of man is with the world as already given and available to man. And as to the origin of the world, the burden of the rabbinic view was straight-forward scriptural (without entering the labyrinth of the metaphysical problematic); as E. Urbach states, it was always that God alone created the world by his word. "The view of the rabbis regarding the creation of the world found its pithy expression in the attribute 'He who said and the world was'." 44

"CREATIO EX NIHILO": MEDIEVAL PERIOD

Explicit, systematized formulation of the view of creatio ex nihilo does not really appear till the medieval period. This is understandable as in the medieval period the philosophic examination and articulation of the faith, and thus the interest in the metaphysical dimension, really penetrates Judaism (through the agency of Islam), and we encounter for the first time a full-fledged, sustained, philosophic, i.e., metaphysical, expression in Judaism. In such a context the articulation of a creatio ex nihilo view is made feasible. Moreover, such a feasibility becomes actually a necessity in as much as the penetration is the penetration of Greek philosophy and metaphysics (i.e., the penetration of the Aristotelian and Platonic views) where the view of creatio ex nihilo is clearly repudiated. In the medieval period Judaism under Islam encounters the full force of the challenge of Greek philosophy to its implied view of creatio ex nihilo and the need to defend it is clearly present.45 It is under these circumstances that a fully explicit articulation of a creatio ex nihilo formulation finds a clear-cut and forceful expression in medieval Jewish philosophy. All the major figures in medieval Jewish philosophy reject the Aristotelian assertion of the existence of primordial matter " and likewise the Platonic view of a hylic substance.47 For medieval Jewish philosophy it is unequivocal that all is created by God out of nothing. Moreover, medieval Jewish philosophy claims that this assertion of creation ex nihilo is an essential, inextricable tenet of the faith of Judaism " and that it has always been, from the earliest expression of the faith of Judaism, i.e., the biblical record, the unequivocal position of Judaism.49 Thus, medieval Jewish philosophy not only explicitly formulates the tenet of creatio ex nihilo; it also claims that it merely articulates a tenet that has characterized Judaism all along and, indeed, characterized it as an essential, inextricable expression of its faith.

A BASIC TENET OF JUDAISM?

Now, as we have already seen, the claim that the creatio ex nihilo view characterized Judaism all along from its very beginnings, when taken from a purely historical perspective, is rather dubious. But in any event, as far as our topic here is concerned, this claim is of rather peripheral interest. Much more central and important to our topic is the claim that the creatio ex nihilo view is a basic and inextricable tenet in the essential structure of faith of Judaism. And here there are a number of considerations that would indeed support this claim. First and most significantly, as we have already seen, the negation of the creatio ex nihilo view impinges negatively, albeit only in a partial but nonetheless important sense, on the monotheistic aspect; and the monotheistic aspect is certainly a basic and inextricable tenet in the essential structure of faith of Judaism. Thus, a case can be made that although in itself the creatio ex nihilo view may not be a basic and inextricable tenet in the essential structure of faith of Judaism, it becomes so by virtue of its impingement upon the monotheistic aspect.

Furthermore, a similar case can be made with the argument that the creatio ex nihilo view, this time when it is affirmed rather than negated, necessarily implicates the desacralization of nature. For in as much as the desacralization of nature is a basic, inextricable element in the essential structure of faith of Judaism (seeing that Judaism by its very essences is not a "nature religion") the creatio ex nihilo view, by virtue of the fact that it necessarily implicates the desacralization of nature, becomes likewise a basic, inextricable element in the essential structure of faith of Judaism. Now, that the affirmation of the creatio ex nihilo view necessarily implicates the desacralization of nature is indeed shown by the very same consideration which has shown above that the negation of the creatio ex nihilo view impinges negatively on the monotheistic aspect — all that one has to do is to draw its implications now with regards to nature rather than with regards to the divine. For the affirmation of the creatio ex nihilo clearly implies that the being of nature is not absolute and therefore that it is not divine (divine in the signification of absoluteness of being). But this is to say — in as much as the notion of desacralization signifies precisely the removal, i.e., the abrogation, the absence, of the divine — that it clearly implies the desacralization of nature.50

It should be clear, however, that the implication of the desacralization of nature by the creatio ex nihilo view is feasible only on the presupposition that the creatio ex nihilo view is articulated in a theistic and not in a pantheistic context. For clearly, in the pantheistic context, if the tenet of creation is to be maintained at all, creation can only signify emanation, and the notion of emanation necessarily attributes divinity to the being of nature. If the being of nature is seen as merely an extension, an overflow, of the divine being, if the being of nature and the being of God are one and the same, then the being of nature is evidently divine. Indeed, the very logic of the notion of desacralization requires that the creatio ex nihilo view and the pantheistic formulation be mutually exclusive — a being cannot be both desacralized and at the same time constituted as part and parcel of the divine being. Only in the theistic context, where the being of nature is distinct, separate and set over-against the being of God, can creatio ex nihilo signify the desacralization of nature. Here, creatio ex nihilo can signify the desacralization of nature by negating the attributes of eternity and independence, namely, by negating the divinity that may be claimed to inhere in a separate, distinct being of nature. If creatio ex nihilo is to signify the desacralization of nature then creatio ex nihilo and theism must go hand in hand — creatio ex nihilo safeguarding against the constituting of nature as divine by virtue of its being a separate, second divine being parallel to the divine being of God, and theism safeguarding against the constituting of nature as divine by virtue of its being part and parcel of the divine being of God." Thus again, a case can be made here that creatio ex nihilo is a fundamental element in the essential structure of Judaism, albeit not by virtue of its own intrinsic signification but by virtue of the fact that in its implication of the desacralization of nature it necessarily presupposes the theistic formulation, a formulation which is fundamental to the essential structure of faith of Judaism.

One can therefore agree with the observation that creatio ex nihilo is fundamental to the essential structure of faith of Judaism. It is fundamental, however, not by virtue of its own immediate, inherent signification but by virtue of the fact that it necessarily implies fundamental elements in the essential structure of faith of Judaism, that is, by virtue of the fact that it necessarily implies the monotheistic aspect, the desacralization of nature and the theistic formulation. Still, important as this is, the real significance of the creatio ex nihilo formulation for Judaism lies, in the last analysis, not in these implications but rather in the way in which it impinges on man's relation to nature. In other words, for Judaism, the real significance of the creatio ex nihilo view lies not so much in its impingement upon the metaphysical domain (i.e., as for example in its implication of the desacralization of nature or of the theistic structure) as in its impingement upon the ethical domain (and this is so even though the creatio ex nihilo view in its own terms is a view which, as we have seen, is formulated in the metaphysical domain).

MAN: ACCOUNTABLE TO GOD FOR CREATION

This impingement upon the ethical domain expresses itself in the fact that the creatio ex nihilo view re-introduces the dimension of accountability and responsability into man's relation towards nature. As we have seen above, in the view of Judaism nature is seen to be constituted as an It-being,52 and as such nature, by its very constitution, could not exact accountability for the action directed toward itself. But now, by virtue of the creatio ex nihilo view, nature is seen as the handiwork of God and therefore as belonging to him as its sole possessor. This in turn means that in relating to nature one necessarily relates also to its creator and owner, i.e., to God — any action directed towards nature necessarily implicates God, the ultimate possessor of nature. For any action directed towards an object is, at the same time, of necessity directed also towards the creator and owner of the object. Unlike nature, however, which because it is constituted as an It-being cannot exact accountability, God being constituted as a Thou-being can and does exact accountability for any action implicating him (and, as we have seen, in the context of creatio ex nihilo, action directed towards nature necessarily implicates God as the creator and owner of nature). Thus the creatio ex nihilo view re-introduces accountability and responsibility although they are directed, it is true, not to nature but to God. That is, while remaining not accountable and responsible to nature, man is now accountable and responsible to God for nature.53 Indeed, the very sanctioning of man's right to act at all towards nature is, under these circumstances, contingent on God's permission; and as such, of course, the permission may well circumscribe and condition the action that it allows.

This is precisely the stance with respect to man's relation to nature that the creatio ex nihilo view establishes within Judaism. For Judaism, nature is neither ownerless, existing in itself, nor is it possessed by man. Nature is the possession of God, and it is merely entrusted to man with the permission, indeed enjoining, to act upon it (and because nature is constituted as an It-being the action that is feasible is essentially utilization and manipulation).54 This permission, however, is not given carte blanche; the option of circumscribing and constraining the action is exercised. Thus, man is enjoined to utilize and manipulate nature but only in as much as this is needed to sustain and benefit his life; he is not permitted to utilize and manipulate nature wantonly and capriciously.55 Secondly, the cruelty and pain which are inevitable implicated in the utilization and manipulation of nature are to be kept, as much as possible, to a minimum.56

This delineation of man's relation to nature is certainly consistent with the essential structure of faith characterizing Judaism particularly with its view of the ontological constitution of nature as an It-being and with its expression of the creatio ex nihilo view, and as such the rationale for this delineation is available. There is, howover, one point that needs some further clarification, namely, what is the rationale for the actual imposition of constraints on man's action towards nature and, indeed, for the specific constraints outlined above. Granted that, as we have argued above, such imposition is in principle feasible (given the view of Judaism that nature is ultimately in the possession of God), this does not explain why the imposition is actually carried out and, indeed, why the specific constraints outlined above rather than some other constraints are imposed. In more traditional language, the question arises as to why does God actually place limits and directives upon man's action towards nature, and why specifically those limits and directives articulated in the tradition. Why not leave the utilization and manipulation of nature completely free and unrestained in the hands of man? Why not let man's action towards nature be arbitrary and capricious? After all, as was noted above, Judaism is not a "nature religion", and indeed in its structure of faith neither the human predicament nor the religious vocation (i.e., the working towards redemption) is constituted in terms of nature (as for example, in terms of the flux and finitude of the beings of nature or in terms of the fertile and destructive forces of nature). Why then should the action upon nature make any difference or be of concern to Judaism?

In answering this one must indeed admit, as we have stated above, that nature does not play a central role in the essential structure of faith of Judaism. Namely, it is true that the central categories of the human predicament and the religious vocation are constituted in terms of society, i.e., in terms of the relations of man to his fellow-man, rather than in terms of nature, and that consequently they are formulated in the context of history and ethics rather than in the context of ontology and metaphysics.57 Still, nature functions here as the necessary and inescapable stage on which the religious drama in its totality unfolds. For not only the predicament (which is to be expected and is fairly common) but the very realization of redemption is formulated in a this-worldly context — the redeemed just society is a this-worldly society, and this means that it is inescapably moored within nature. Thus, although nature does not constitute the "stuff" of the religious drama (neither the predicament nor the redemption formulate themselves in terms of nature), it does constitute its necessary presupposition. As such, the continued existence of nature is necessary not only for the unfolding but for the very realization of the religious vocation and this, in turn, means that nature cannot be simply entrustred, i.e., entrusted without constraints or directives, to the hands of man since the arbitrary and capricious action of man is all too readily destructive.

PRESERVATION OF NATURE IN VIEW OF MAN

On the other hand, given the structure of faith operating there, the constraints and directives that are introduced, and whose purpose is to safeguard nature against utilization and manipulation, i.e., against its destruction (for utilization and manipulation necessarily implicate destruction), cannot be such as to safeguard nature against any and all utilization and manipulation. For after all the required preservation of nature here is not for its own sake but for the sake of the social entity which is moored in a this-worldly context (since it is in its terms that the religious vocation, i.e., the vocation of establishing social justice, is formulated); and this, in turn, means that, in the last analysis, it is for the sake of man as he is constituted in a this-worldly context that the preservation of nature is required.58 But man as a this-worldly entity is constituted as an inextricable union of nature and the divine. As against viewing nature as an It-being and God as a Thou-being, Judaism views man as an inextricable It-Thou being; indeed, as Genesis presents him, man is at one and the same time part and parcel of nature, a creature (by virtue of being an It), and a carrier of the divine image (by virtue of being a Thou) 59 Thus this means that as such for man being as an It, as a creature). Rather, the predicament is located in the improper balance that man in expressing himself strikes between the It and the Thou dimension. The predicament lies in the fact that all too often man yields to the "imperialistic" tendency of the It dimension to dominate the totality of his life; even more specifically, it lies in the It dimension assuming the direction of life rather than submitting itself to the guidance and direction of the Thou dimension. Commensurate to this, redemption here constitutes itself not in extirpating the It dimension (thus constituting redeemed man as a "new being", as a pure Thou), but in restoring the proper balance between the It and the Thou dimension. Clearly, predicament and redemption are formulated here not in the ontological domain (indeed, we encounter here no doctrine of a Fall) but in the ethical domain; they are formulated not in terms of how the being of man is constituted but rather in terms of how man expresses and realizes the being that he has, i.e., in terms of man's behavior, actions and relations. Indeed, as such, i.e., being formulated in the ethical domain, the burden of the predicament centers itself on the imbalance between the It and the Thou dimension as it expresses itself not internally in terms of the individual as such, but rather externally in terms of the relation of the individual to his fellow-man (the imbalance constituting in this context social exploitation, i.e., social injustice); and correspondingly, the burden of redemption directs itself likewise towards the social context rather than towards the individual as such — it directs itself towards establishing the right balance between the It and the Thou dimension as it expresses itself specifically in the relation between man and his fellow-man, namely, it directs itself towards establishing the righteous community.

Furthermore, it is here, in the working towards establishing the righteous community, i.e., in the working towards redemption, that man by virtue of his Thou dimension is capable of being a partner to God, i.e., a co-worker and co-creator with God. Indeed, this is the meaning of the designation of man in the tradition as a partner to God. Man as a Thou is a partner in realizing the goal of creation, i.e., in bringing about redemption, but not in the act of creation itself; he is a co-worker in the making of history, i.e., in establishing the righteous community, but not in the making of nature, i.e., in constituting the physical universe; in short, he is a co-actor in the drama but not a co-worker in setting the stage for the unfolding of the drama. Indeed, in terms of reason and the workings of the inner logic of the Thou dimension, one may see that being a co-worker and co-creator is feasible with regard to history and society but not with regard to nature. The creation of nature (in the sense, of course, of creatio ex nihilo and not of the artisan shaping his artifact) is an act surpassing rationality and excluded by the inner logic of the Thou dimension. How a Thou being, is part and parcel of nature, i.e., an It-being, his very existence depends upon the preservation of nature, and the destruction of nature inevitably means his own destruction.6° Yet paradoxically, at the very same time, precisely in being an It-being, a being of nature, man in order to exist, let alone prosper, must inevitably utilize and exploit (and thus partially destroy) nature. The very existence of man and certainly his well-being and prosperity necessarily implicate his utilization and exploitation of nature. Thus, some utilization, i.e., destruction, of nature must be allowed while at the same time the preservation of nature is required.

Evidently, the directives which the tradition articulates in order to delineate man's relation to nature find their rationale in this rather paradoxical situation which man's ontological constitution dictates. Namely, it is man and his needs which determine the stance that the tradition takes with regard to nature. Thus, in forbidding, on the one hand, the wanton destruction of nature, it reflects the need to preserve nature; on the other hand, in sanctioning and indeed commanding the exploitation of nature when this is done for the sake of man, it reflects the realization that man's existence and well-being inevitably involve the exploitation of nature.

ACCOUNTABILITY TO FELLOW-MEN

These considerations suggest, by the way, that my fellow-man is yet another being (beside God) that can exact accountability and indeed, as we shall argue presently, exact accountability specifically for the action directed towards nature. For, as we have seen above, to exact accountability a being must be constituted as a Thou; thus, in contra-distinction to nature, God being constituted as Thou can exact accountability. By the same token, however, it also follows now that my fellow-man too is a being that can exact accountability, for he too is constituted as a Thou, albeit only in one dimension of his being, but this is all that is required (especially since it is an inextricable dimension of his being)." But granted that my fellow-man being constitued as an It-Thou being can exact accountability by virtue of the fact that in one inextricable dimension of his being he is constituted as a Thou, can this capacity impinge upon action directed towards nature? What rationale, what justification, does my fellow-man have for exacting accountability for action directed towards nature? In the case of God, as we have seen, the rationale and justification were derived from the consideration whereby nature is made the possession of God (this being established through the creatio ex nihilo view) thereby giving God a stake in what is done to nature. This evidently does not apply to my fellow-man. Are there then any other considerations which will give my fellow-man a stake in what is done to nature, thus providing the rationale and justification for his exercising his capacity to exact accountability with regard to the action directed towards nature?

We would submit that there are two such considerations. First, my fellow-man has a stake in what is done to nature by virtue of the fact that he is also constituted in the other inextricable dimension of his being as an It, i.e., as an inextricable part and parcel of nature. As such, what is done to nature impinges very much upon his very being and consequently he has every justification to exact accountability for the action directed towards nature. Secondly, my fellow-man has a stake in what is done to nature by virtue of the fact that he is entrusted with the vocation of realizing redemption, i.e., with the vocation of establishing the righteous community. True, this redemptive task is not constituted in terms of nature but in terms of history (indeed my fellow-man is entrusted with this vocation by virtue of his being a Thou, a being transcending nature, and not by virtue of his being an It, a being which is part and parcel of nature). Still, in as much as the pursuit and, indeed, the very realization of this vocation remain in a this-worldly context, nature is inescapably involved — the preservation of nature is a condition sine qua non for the pursuit and realization of the redemptive task. As such, keeping in mind that this redemptive task constitutes the raison d'etre for man's existence and, indeed, the source providing the meaning to his life, my fellow-man has again every justification to exact accountability for the action directed towards nature." Thus, not only God but my fellow-man too has a claim on what I do to nature. My accountability and responsibility to God for my action towards nature can now be further extended or, so to speak, refracted into accountability and responsability to my fellow-man.

CONCLUSION

Thus, Judaism succeeds in establishing accountability that is firmly moored both in the divine and in manfor the action directed towards nature, even though nature is viewed as being constituted as an It and as such incapable in its own terms to exact accountability for action directed towards itself. Indeed, though in its own terms nature is not the bearer of value (as an It-being it is neutral to valuation), value is placed on nature by virtue of the role it is assigned in the economy of redemption (which economy unfolds in the sphere of the Thou). In other words, by virtue of being the stage on which the drama of redemption is to unfold itself, by virtue of providing the inescapable context in which both the pursuit and the realization of redemption can take place, it is invested with a positive valuation — "and God saw that it was good" (Gen 1:12, 18, 31). Thus, in Judaism nature is neither negated nor is it romanticized; it is neither neglected nor is it placed on a pedestal. Neither reverence, awe or passive submission, on the one hand, nor callousness, disregard or arbitrariness, on the other hand, constitute the proper relating to nature. Nature is to be utilized but it is to be utilized with responsibility. Nature is an It-being but it is an It-being which is the handiwork and possession of God; it is an It-being which is necessary for the fulfillment of the vocation of the Thou.

It is in this middle, balanced position which Judaism strikes that a distinctive contribution towards a tenable and viable view of nature is made. It realistically sees nature as being constituted as an It-being and draws the inescapable implications from this. Yet, at the same time, it does not forsake nature to whim and caprice by leaving it outside the sphere of ethical concern; it succeeds in incorporating nature within the bounds of the ethical domain, thus imposing accountability and responsibility for our action towards nature.

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1. At the very start we should hasten to point out that the stance that Judaism takes with regard to this subject is not monolithic. In its various expressions we can encounter rather radically different conceptions of nature and consequently rather radically different formulations of man's relation to nature. This follows from the fact that Judaism, as indeed any other historical religious tradition, is not monolithic as regards its basic religious Weltanschauung (what we would call "the essential structure of faith," i.e., the basic view of man and the world and consequently the conception of what constitutes the ultimate predicament and commensurate to this the formulation of the salvation offered and the view of the divine). Rather, it is a mixture of different religious Weltanschauungen held together by the sharing of common symbols, rituals and institutions (the differences manifesting themselves when one comes to ascertain the signification attributed to these common symbols, rituals and institutions). In view of this, it is important note that the description and analysis that are to follow undertake to represent only one specific trend within the historical religious tradition of Judaism. They undertake to represent what might be designated as the prophetic trend in the biblical context and the non-mystical, halakhic trend in the rabbinic context. This certainly leaves out other trends which found expression within the historical religious tradition of Judaism. In particular, it leaves out the priestly-wisdom trend in the biblical context and the mystical trend in the rabbinic context; and there is no denying that the "picture" which emerges in these trends is quite different from the "picture" which emerges in the trend represented here. Our defense for leaving out of consideration these trends and centering on the non-mystical, socio-ethical trend lies in the following two considerations: a) we would want to argue that unlike the other trends, the trend represented here formulates a religious Weltanschauung — and specifically, given our concern in this paper, a view of the relation of man to nature — which is distinctive and, indeed, unique; b) we would want to argue that although granting that the mystical trend was quite pervasive, the main thrust of the phenomenon of Judaism lies nonetheless in the trend represented here. In any event, it should be kept clearly in mind that throughout this paper the Judaism represented is the Judaism expressing itself in the non-mystical halakhic trend.
2. This stance is most clearly delineated already in the story of Adam's and Eve's transgression. Though the earth had in no way taken part in the transgression, it is cursed because of Adam's transgression (Gen 3:17). This is even more poignantly expressed in the story of the flood. The land and all life is destroyed because of the social evil-doing of man (Gen 6:11-13). But perhaps the most explicit expression of the passive role given to nature, making its fortunes dependent on man's conduct, is to be found in Deuteronomy 11:13-17 where the productivity of the land is explicitly made contingent on the obedience of man to God's commandments.
3 It will be noted, however, that the case of the It-being was formulated somewhat differently from the way the case of the Thou-being was formulated. In the case of the It-being we said that an I-Thou relation would not "make sense" while in the case of the Thou-being we said that an I-It relation would not be "feasible". We would want to argue that this is indeed the case if the matter is to be delineated precisely. Namely, one can address an It-being but to do that would not make sense; on the other hand, one cannot relate in an I-It fashion to a Thou-being because the very I-It relating excludes the other to which one relates from being a Thou-being. This is so in as much as the Thou-being, i.e., the being-of-Consciousness, arises from the I-Thou relation. The Thou-being is by its very ontological constitution relational and can be constituted
only by the I-Thou relation. Thus, an I-It relation would not constitute a Thou-being. Here indeed, the relation is ontologically primary and this means that the relation determines the kind of being involved rather than vice versa. (Of course, the presence of a Thou-being would as such necessarily implicate the presence of an I-Thou relation.) The It-being, i.e., the being-of-Power, on the other hand, is not relational in its very ontological constitution; it is not constituted by the relation. The relation is here external and, indeed, secondary. As such, the It-being is not determined by the relation and consequently an I-Thou relation towards it is in principle feasible as far as its constitution is concerned (though in the last analysis it is not really feasible in as much as the required mutuality for the I-Thou relation cannot be forthcoming from the side of the It-being and consequently the other, i.e., the "I" in the I-Thou relation which must be constituted as a Thou cannot be so constituted). What can be said for sure, however, is that vis-a-vis at It-being an I-Thou relation would not make sense.
In this connection it may be also noted, however, that Buber does mention an I-Thou relation with a tree. Does this mean that Buber claims the feasibility of an I-Thou relation with an It-being? There is no denying that it is very difficult to understand or accept Buber's claim. It is interesting to note that Buber himself, having made the claim, fails to develop or enlarge upon it; in the large corpus of his writings where the theme of the I-Thou relation is so pervasive, the application of this relation is confined almost exclusively to the domains between man and man and between man and God. Namely, the I-Thou relation is applied to beingsof-Consciousness and not to beings-of-Power. Still, the claim that an I-Thou relation with a tree is feasible is made. How is one to explain it? Perhaps we can explain it by suggesting that Buber is reflecting here, albeit in his It-Thou terminology, the ontological view of Lurianic mysticism. According to this view, every being in creation is constituted alike — a nitsots, i.e., a divine spark, enveloped by a kelippah, i.e., a shell. Thus, there is no qualitative distinction in the ontological constitution of the realm of beings constituting creation. The only distinction available is a quantitative distinction — the thickness of the shell enveloping and concealing the spark. Now, in as much as the spark is clearly a Thou-being (while the shell is an It being), an I-Thou relation with every being in creation is feasible and understandable. It is feasible with a tree or, for that matter, with a stone just as much as it is feasible with a fellow human-being. The only difference is that as compared to man, in a tree or, even more so, in a stone the shell is much thicker and the Thou-being is consequently less clearly manifested, making the establishment of a I-Thou relation that much more difficult. In any event, on the basis of this explanation there is no problem between Buber's assertion of an I-Thou relation with a tree and our contention that an I-Thou relation can be constituted only with a Thou-being, i.e., a being-of-Consciousness. For the I-Thou relation with the tree is constituted by relating to the nitsots which is a Thou-being, a being-of-Consciousness.
4. The presentation of the snake in the story of the Garden of Eden conversing with Eve (Gen 3:1-5) is clearly a relic from pre-biblical pagan mythology; the story in which Balaam's mule is made to talk (Num 22: 28-30) would seem to be a folk-tale; the presentation of trees talking in Mashal Yotam (Judg 9:8-15) is clearly an allegory. But even so there are very few such instances, and by no stretch of the imagination can they be taken to suggest that the biblical view endows nature with consciousness. Still, it must be granted that the further question of where precisely to draw the dividing-line between the domain of the It-being and the domain of the Thou-being is not so clear or easy. That is, it is not clear whether the dividing-line is to be drawn through the human realm or through the animal realm; in other words, it is not clear whether animals are to be relegated in toto to nature, i.e., to the domain of the It-being, or whether they are to be viewed as transcending nature to some extent, albeit minimally, thus sharing in the domain of the Thou-being. The latter view would seem to be reflected in the attitude of za'ar ba'alai bairn, i.e., compassion for animals, and, even more significantly, in the commandment of the Noachite covenant according to which the, blood of the animal is not to be eaten, for the life or the soul of the animal resides in its blood (Gen 9:4). This suggests the presence of the Thou-dimension in the animal, i.e., its soul or life, which as such, of course, cannot be related to as an It, namely, it cannot be eaten. .Still, the burden of the attitude towards animals reflects the former view, i.e., they are related to as It-beings in as much as they can be utilized and exploited as labor, as human nourishment, or as guinea pigs in experimentation.
5. In the context of an ontological bifurcation that precipitates exclusively the alternative between a Thou-being and an It-being, the exclusion of the Thou-being necessarily implicates the presence of the It-being.
6. In this connection it is important to point out that man's relation to nature being an I-It relation does not preclude the relation from being one of enjoying nature. On the contrary, enjoyment is very much an I-It relation; it is nothing else but a refined form of utilization. Enjoyment is contingent on perceiving the object as beautiful and beauty, in turn, is contingent on order, proportion, balance, harmony — all being functions of quantity which is an aspect belonging exclusively to the It-dimension. Likewise, man's relation to nature being an I-It relation would not preclude the relation from being one of awe and wonder before nature. Awe and wonder are expressions of the I-It relation if only because they are elicited by magnitude and complexity, i.e., quanticized categories, and as we have just noted, quantity is an aspect belonging exclusively to the It-dimension. Wonder and awe are contingent on perceiving the object as powerful and intricate — if the Power manifested is sufficiently overwhelming or sufficiently intricate, awe and wonder will be elicited. Both fascination and dread, beauty and awe are linked to the manifestations of Power and can consequently arise only in relation to an It-being. Thus, the various expressions of the enjoyment of nature or of the wonder and awe before nature which we do encounter in biblical and rabbinic literature, far from contradicting and undermining our contention actually fit very neatly and logically with it, namely, they are consistent with, and indeed, derived from the perception of nature as being constituted as an It-being.
Furthermore, the conception of nature as being constituted as an It-being would also not preclude the possibility of man participating in nature and feeling at one with it. For if we keep in mind that man, as we shall see more fully below, is viewed as being constituted as an It-Thou being, as a being constituted by both the It-dimension and the Thou-dimension i.e., as a being sharing both in the dimension of Power and in the dimension of Consciousness, then by virtue of his It-dimension man can indeed participate in nature and feel at one with it. Thus, expressions to this effect that may be encountered in the tradition are quite consistent with the view of nature as being constituted as an It-being.
7. See, for example, Is 27:1, 51:9-10, Ps 74:13-14. Job 7:12.
8. See, for example, Job 38:4-8, Is 40:12, 21-22.
9. The fact that we have here two different versions stemming from different traditions, and that indeed there are some significant variations and differences between the two versions, does not impinge upon our main thesis in this paper and consequently we need not go into it here.
10. It is not surprising, therefore, that most treatments of the subject of creation in later Jewish tradition turn to this chapter as the main, indeed almost exclusive, source of the biblical conception of creation.
11. Indeed, the other biblical references to creation given above, i.e., the references in Job, Isaiah, and Psalms, also deal exclusively with the "how" of creation and as such, aside from the other considerations given above, are not of such use to our purposes here.
12. For time is contingent on motion which, in turn, is contingent on matter. Thus, the category of time can be available only if matter exists. Creation in time, therefore, necessarily implicates the pre-existence of matter. Only in the formulation of creatio ex nihilo is the act of creation not in time; here time is brought into being in the very act of creation. This consideration, by the way, should be kept in mind in interpreting the medieval formulations of creatio ex nihilo, particularly the formulation of Maimonides, as regards the homer kadmon, i.e., primordial matter. See especially I. Epstein, The Faith of Judaism, ch. 9 (pp. 88-92 in the Hebrew translation) and his disagreement with the interpretation given by HA. Wolfson in his essay "The Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic Theories of Creation in Hallevi and Maimonides" in The Herz Jubilee Volume.
13. Here perhaps lies the rationale for inferring a creatio ex nihilo view from creation by speech alone, i.e., from the formula "And God said let there be . . . and it was so." For one would expect that the creation, i.e., fashioning, of matter would implicate concrete, mechanical action in as much as only concrete, mechanical action can affect matter. One would not expect speech to impinge on matter; namely, one would not expect that speech can in any way affect matter. Thus, creation by speech alone would lead one to exclude matter as the object of creation. Creation by speech alone would imply the absence of pre-existent matter and therefore creation out of nothing, i.e., creatio ex nihilo. But of course what may be the case in the ordinary course of events is not necessarily also the case in events pertaining to the divine. Indeed, the Genesis narrative dearly states that the divine speech does affect matter. Thus, for example, in Genesis 1:9, God commands the water to gather in one place and it is done; or in Genesis 1:11 God commands the earth to bring forth grass and trees and it is done. Clearly, the Genesis narrative, taken in its own terms, does not support the inference that creation by speech alone would preclude pre-existent matter. On the contrary, it clearly implicates creation by speech alone with pre-existent matter. Thus, in the context of the Genesis narrative creation by speech alone does not imply a creatio ex nihilo view.
14. Aside from the model of the artisan suggesting the pre-existence of matter, the very notion of creation here as the establishment of order out of chaos suggests the pre-existence of matter. For chaos and order are evidently but manifestations of matter — they denote states of the being-of-Power. Thus, the pre-existence of chaos would suggest the pre-existence of some matter which is in a state of chaos and which is then transformed to a state of order (the latter comprising the event of creation).
15. G. Ernest Wright, The Old Testament and Theology, New York: Harper and Row, 1969, pp. 74-75. See also Bernhard W. Anderson, Creation or Chaos, New York: Association Press, 1967, ch. 2.
16. Is 51:9-11.
17. See G. von Rad's essay, "The Theological Problem of the Old Testament Doctrine of Creation" in The Problem of the Hexateuch and Other Essays, New York: McGraw Hill, 1966.
18. G. Ernest Wright, op. cit., p. 80. This motif is also clearly stated in the treatment of creation in the Psalms. See, for example, Psalms 104-106.
19. G. Ernest Wright, op. cit., p. 76.
20. The imposition of order over chaos and the model of the artisan express, precisely in their metaphysical signification, the fundamental pagan view of creation and are widely reflected in the various creation epics of paganism though, of course, they receive their classic explicit expression later on in the Platonic myth in the Timaeus.
21. This, however, is a partial signification of the notion of the divine. For a fuller analysis of the notion of the divine as it impinges on our topic here, see below footnote 50 on pp. 32-34. It should be noted therefore that we are not claiming here that the creatio ex nihilo aspect does in truth impinge negatively on the monotheistic aspect, only that such a view may suggest itself. In truth it impinges negatively on the monotheistic aspect only partially, namely, only when the notion of the divine is taken in its partial signification of absoluteness, i.e., of being the being that is non-dependent and non-contingent.
22. Only considerably later on, in the medieval philosophic expression, is this implication grasped and is, indeed, taken as the basis for the claim that the affirmation of a creatio ex nihilo view is present in biblical thought from the very beginning. Though from a historical perspective such a claim would seem to be wrong, from the perspective of the inner logic of biblical thought it is insightful and valid.
23. This is perhaps due in part to the fact that in the state of exile-existence (i.e., the state prevailing in talmudic times) the historical dimension is truncated.
24. Genesis Rabbah I. 15.
25. Gen. R. XII. 14.
26. Gen. R. II. 4.
27. Gen. R. I. 14.
28. See, for example, Gen. R. IV. 7 or I. 9.
29. Gen. R. I. 1.
30. E. Urbach suggests this with regard to the mythological references most of which originated at the end of the tannaitic and the beginning of the amoraic period (Rav in particular is credited with a good many of these stories). See Hazal, Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1969, p. 170.
31. See E. Urbach, op. cit., pp. 172-173.
32. Also, in this connection one should note the number of amoraic statements rejecting the notion that the angels were partners in the act of creation. See, for example, the speculation in Gen. R. I. 3 regarding on which day the angels were created (the second and fifth day are proposed), but particularly the statement of Rabbi Isaac that all agree that it was not on the first day so that no one could say that they helped God in the work of creation. The significance of these statements becomes even more poignant when one keeps in mind that the notion of the angels being partners in creation is a common, central motif in the gnostic-dualistic view.
33. Indeed, at times, this interchangeability is justified objectively by the intertwining of the two formulations, namely, when the creator, divine coeval being is identified with the created, substantive coeval being, the two becoming one being; this is possible in as much as the creator, divine coeval being here is a "nature god" and as such has its essense in the domain of nature, i.e., in the domain of the created, in the substance of the world. Thus, we get the identification of the "prince of the sea" or the "prince of darkness" with the primordial waters or the primordial darkness respectively.
34. Thus, it is possible to have a dualistic formulation without necessarily having at the same time a negation of creatio ex nihilo as, for example, when the creator co-being is itself a created being but created prior to the creation of the world. As such, all acts of creation may well be ex nihilo while at the same time in the creation of the world God has a partner. Theoretically at least, this should certainly be possible; but the status given to the angels or the "prince of darkness" in some of the rabbinic statements may well implicate such a situation in the literature. Of course, the negation of creatio ex nihilo does necessarily implicate dualism, but only in the fundamental sense of there being two ultimate independent beings and not in the more specific sense of there being a partner-creator which, however, is the sense in which dualism is used here.
35. Hag. 12:1.
36. In this connection, however, we should mention the view of Rabbi Judah in the name of Rabbi Simon that time existed prior to creation (see Gen. R. III. 7). Given our argument above, this should suggest the existence of primordial matter. This, however, does not seem to be really the case here. For the statement here reported by Rabbi Judah would seem to receive its rationale from the view propounded by Rabbi Abbahu that God created and destroyed any number of worlds prior to creating this world. As such, if anything, the statement clearly links the existence of time to the act of creation and consequently its clear inference is to negate the existence of primordial matter. The statement only pushes the act of creation further into the past prior to the creation of this world. Thus, while with regard to this world time is indeed already in existence, it is not in existence prior to any act of creation, i.e., from eternity. It is, however, this latter consideration which constitutes the crux of the matter and it clearly implicates the absence of primordial matter.
37. Gen. R. III. 1.
38. And therefore, as to the specific question under discussion, excludes any consideration of precedence between the creation of light and the creation of darkness.
39. The ayin, the nothingness, which he mentions would seem to be hypostasized; of course, we should also note that in this very same incident Rabbi Joshua ben Hananiah unequivocally rejects any hint of such affirmation.
40. Gen. R. I. 9.
41. See E. Urbach, op. cit., p. 167.
42. Y. Epstein, Emunat Hayahadut, Jerusalem: Mosad HaRav Kuk, 1965, p. 86.
43. Hag. 2:1. This is also expressed in one interpretation of why the creation account begins with the letter beth — to show that "you have no permission to inquire what is above, what is below" Gen. R. I. 10.
44. E. Urbach, op. cit., p. 189. But strictly speaking, this leaves the question of creatio ex nihilo somewhat ambiguous. For even though, as was pointed out above, creation by speech alone may suggest a creatio ex nihilo view, creation here nonetheless may still be taken to signify the introduction of order into chaos, the mere molding of chaotic primordial matter into an ordered universe on the model of the artisan forming his artifact.
45. See Yechezkel Epstein, Emunat HaYahadut (translation of the Faith of Judaism), Jerusalem: Mosad HaRav Kuk, 1965, p. 86.
46. Thus, for example, see Saadia, Beliefs and Opinions, I, pp. 1-15; Maimonides, Guide to the Perplexed, II, pp. 13-31; Albo, Ikkarim, I, p. 23.
47. Though here we have the notable exception of Gersonides. See Milhamot Adonai, IV.
48. See, for example, Albo, op. cit., I, p. 23. Maimonides, however, would seem to be a clear and important exception. Maimonides accepts the creatio ex nihilo view, but only because, according to him, it is not possible to philosophically prove or disprove the existence of a primordial substance. That is, since rationally one cannot decide between the two alternatives, one is faced with an arbitrary decision between the Aristotelian position affirming the existence of primordial substance, and what he takes to be the biblical position affirming creatio ex nihilo, and in these circumstances (and only because these circumstances prevail) he opts for what he takes to be the biblical position, i.e., the affirmation of creatio ex nihilo. But most significantly he adds that if philosophical arguments could be adduced in favor of the existence of a primordial substance, he would have no problem in adopting Aristotle and rejecting the affirmation of creatio ex nihilo. Thus, clearly, for Maimonides the creatio ex nihilo view is not an inextricable tenet of the essential structure of faith of Judaism.
49. There are many attempts to establish this in conjunction with the Hebrew verb bara which is used in the biblical account of creation, as, for example, Saadia in his commentary to Isaiah, Maimonides in the Guide, III, ch. 10, Ramban and Bahia ben Asher in their respective commentaries to Genesis 1:1.
50. In this connection it may be instructive to briefly compare the desacralization of nature in Judaism with the desacralization of nature effected by Greek philosophy. It has been claimed that the desacralization of nature is brought about both by Judaism and by Greek philosophy (see, for example, J. Ernest Wright, op. cit., pp. 72-73). Judaism brings about desacralization by constituting the being of nature as a created being, i.e., as a dependent temporally finite being, while Greek philosophy brings about desacralization through demythologizing nature, i.e., by converting the nature gods into symbols. Thus, it is suggested that Judaism and Greek philosophy differ only in the way by which they effect desacralization (Judaism effecting it through its creatio ex nihilo view, while Greek philosophy effects it through its assertion of the supremacy of reason over myth), but that the end-result attained, i.e., the desacralization of nature, is the same. This, however, is misleading. For clearly, the demythologizing of Greek philosophy desacralizes nature in a different sense than does the creatio ex nihilo view of Judaism. The creatio ex nihilo view desacralizes nature in the sense of denying it absolute being. As against this, Greek philosophy desacralizes nature in the sense of denying it personal being — it converts the personified being, the apparent Thou-being, which the mythopoetic imagination attributes to nature, into an impersonal being, an It-being. Greek philosophy certainly does not deny the absoluteness of the being of nature. Indeed, its very essence, i.e., the supremacy of reason, dictates its uncompromising negation of the creatio ex nihilo view (out of nothing only nothing can come), and consequently its affirmation of the absoluteness (i.e., the primordial status) of the being of nature. Clearly, the notion of divinity and correspondingly the notion of desacralization bear here two distinct and different significations —personhood and absoluteness. Creatio ex nihilo and philosophic demythologizing each abrogate divinity, i.e., desacralize, in the sense of only one of these significations but not of the other. Still, in the context of Judaism this partial desacralization brought about by creatio ex nihilo actually effects the radical, total desacralization of nature. For, as we have seen, nature from the very start is already constituted as an It-being (and not as a Thou-being). In other words, as regards the signification of personhood, nature is never divinized to begin with, or in other words, it is already desacralized (and as such, with the desacralization effected by creatio ex nihilo, nature in Judaism is now radically and totally desacralized both in the signification of personhood and in the signification of absoluteness). In the context of Greek philosophy, on the other hand, nature continues to be divinized in the signification of absoluteness, and the only desacralization effected here is in the signification of personhood.
" No wonder that creation and theism are so intimately linked in biblical and rabbinic thought. Indeed, perhaps the real significance of the notion of creation by the sole agency of speech alone (a notion originating in the Genesis account and widely expressed in rabbinic thought — see the references to b'ria bema'amar, i.e., to creation by speech, as, for example, in Avot 5. 1, Mekh. 10 (p. 150), Gen. R. XVII. 1, or to God as "He who spoke and the world was", as, for example, in San. 19 a) lies in the fact that it very much suggests the theistic structure — speech and command suggest over-againstness between the speaker, i.e., the creator, and the recipient or the object of the speech, i.e., the created.
In this connection, however, it is interesting to note that in the Kabbalah the formula of creatio ex nihilo is used in a context where creation is understood in terms of emanation, namely in a context that is pantheistic. This is done by identifying the divine with nothingness — God is nothingness. For the literal meaning of the tenet of creatio ex nihilo, particularly in its Hebrew formulation of yesh me-ayin, states that that which is (i.e., the yesh) is brought forth from nothingness (i.e., the ayin). But now on the basis of identifying nothingness (i.e., the ayin) with the divine, the tenet is made to state that that which is, i.e., the world, is brought forth from the divine — a clear expression of creation understood as divine emanation. Evidently, what we have here is a signification that is totally different from and, indeed, incompatible with the signification that the formulation bears in the Judaism presented here. It is a good example of how radically different significations, i.e., essential structures of faith, can be held together under the rubric of the same historical religious tradition by virtue of the adoption of the same verbal expression of the tenet.
52. Indeed, one is tempted to say that by the same token that God is viewed to be constituted as the "eternal Thou", i.e., as the being which by its very constitution cannot be but a Thou, nature can be viewed to be constituted as the "eternal It", i.e., as the being which by its very constitution cannot be but an It. By the way, it is this qualitative distinction between the being of God as the "eternal Thou" and the being of nature as the "eternal It" that provides the ultimate rationale, i.e., a rationale grounded in the ontological domain, for the non-pantheistic, i.e., theistic, posture of Judaism.
53. This implicates a further radical difference between Judaism and Greek philosophy as regards the desacralization of nature, the difference here lying in the impingement of the desacralization of nature on the ethical domain. For while in Judaism accountability and responsibility for action directed towards nature are retained in spite of desacralization (or more precisely put, they are retained because of desacralization, the desacralization being effected by creatio ex nihilo), in Greek philosophy, precisely because there is no desacralization effected by creatio ex nihilo, the desacralization that is effected and which constitutes nature as an It-being leaves nature (qua It-being) as an absolute being (i.e., as an independent and coeval being), and consequently without any possibility whatsoever of introducing accountability and responsibility for the action directed towards it. Thus, in Judaism, because of creatio ex nihilo accountability and responsibility are re-introduced even though nature is constituted as an It-bein; on the other hand, in Greek philosophy there can be no accountability or responsibility with regard to the action directed towards nature.
54. See our comments above regarding Genesis 1:28 where man is enjoined to subdue and dominate nature.
55. This constraint finds expression in the various laws coming under the heading of Bal tashhit (i.e., you shall not destroy). Thus, for example, felling a tree for the purpose of kindling fire is allowed, but when done for mere fun it is forbidden; or, killing an animal for the purpose of eating is permitted, but killing an animal for the sport of hunting is forbidden. On this latter example see the interesting responsum by Rabbi Yechezkel Landau quoted in S. Freehof, A Treasury of Responsa, pp. 216-219.
56. This is particularly elaborated in rabbinic literature. See, for example, the laws pertaining to shehita, i.e., the slaughtering of animals.
57. In this connection it is interesting to note the claim made by von Rad that the notion of creation (a notion that is most intimately connected with nature and which, indeed, can arise only when nature is a central concern of the structure of faith) does not find expression in the ancient credo of biblical Israel nor, indeed, in the Yahwist and Elohist accounts. According to von Rad the theme of creation enters the picture considerably later only when it could be theologically linked with the distinctive and primary concern of biblical Israel which lay in the domain of history, i.e., encountering the saving acts of God in history. That is, the theme of creation, which originally and by the very essence of its signification is concerned with the domain of nature, when it is incorporated into the structure of biblical faith is given a signification that refers to the domain of history, i.e., it is the first of the saving acts of God constituting salvific history. Even so the theme of creation is not the central concern, and it is often used (e.g., deutero-Isaiah) merely "in a subordinate clause or in apposition . . . intended to reinforce confidence in the power of Jahweh and his readiness to help". Only in wisdom literature does the theme of creation occupy a central position. Here it is "referred to for its own sake" and serves as "an absolute basis for faith" (see G. von Rad, Old Testament Theology, vol. I, pp. 136-139). Clearly, the Judaism presented here is not grounded in wisdom literature; it is grounded in prophecy and the historical narrative. Indeed, when in a theological context the alternative is set between Creation and the Exodus as to which is to constitute the foundation-stone of the structure of faith, the Judaism presented here clearly opts for the Exodus.
58. In Judaism, the religious drama and vocation revolve around man as a this-worldly entity (most significantly, the realization of the religious vocation does not transcend man as a this-worldly entity). Thus the preservation of man as a this-worldly entity is a condition sine qua non for the structure of Judaism.
59. By the way, Judaism views this ontological constitution of man as an inextricable It-Thou being as good. Thus, the predicament is not located in the ontological constitution of man; it is not located in the very presence of the It dimension (there is nothing wrong with man being constituted in one aspect of histo exist, the preservation of nature is required. For in as much as man, in an inextricable aspect of his can create, i.e., bring into being, an It is a mystery which as such can be, perhaps, attributed to the divine (and even here, as seen, its signification is shifted from being scientific or metaphysical to being ethical and religious) but certainly not to man. Thus, when it comes to the creation of nature the tradition is quite clear that man is not a co-worker. In setting the stage God has no partners or collaborators; he is the sole creator. And man who is to play such a central role in the drama that unfolds on this stage is himself a created being. This is poignantly stated in Sanhedrin 4.5. The rabbis asked: "Why was man created last?" and they answered: "so that the heretics would not say: there was a partner with him (i.e., God) in his work (i.e., in the work of creation)." This represents the considered view of the rabbis and it is not undermined, it would seem to us, by one or two references in the Talmud which on the surface may appear to suggest that man is viewed as a partner to God in the work of creation. Thus, we have the statement of Rabbi Hamnuna that a person reciting on the eve of the Sabbath "and the heaven and the earth were finished" is considered as though he had become a partner to God in the work of creation (Shab. 119 b); or, we have the statement that a judge who dispenses justice with complete fairness even for one hour is considered as though he were a partner to God in the work of creation (Shab. 10 a). But these statements do not really say that man is actually a partner in the work of creation. The qualifier "as though" is crucial here to the proper understanding of these statements. What the statements actually say is that some acts are prized so highly by Scripture that a person who performs them receives the great credit of being considered by Scripture as though he were a partner in the work of creation. Furthermore, it is rather interesting to note which acts are so highly prized — the sanctification of the Sabbath and the dispensation of justice. Both symbolize not the work of creation but rather the goal, the end, of creation — that for the sake of which the world is created. (True, the two instances mentioned signify radically opposed notions of the end, the Sabbath signifying the cessation of activity and the transcending of the flux of creation thus fulfilling creation by its negation, while justice signifies the proper dispensation and use of activity thus fulfilling creation by its affirmation. Evidently, these two goals have far-reaching ramifications and implicate radically different structures of faith, though we obviously cannot pursue this matter here. Suffice it to say that the Judaism presented here sees the goal of creation as lying in the pursuit of social justice). We would want to say, therefore, that the statement "man is a partner in the work of creation" is to be understood as elliptical, its full meaning being that man is a partner in the work toward fulfilling the goal of creation. Such elliptical usage may be quite understandable in as much as the goal of a thing constitutes the very essence of the thing.
60. Thus, each man should say "for me was the world created" (Sanh. 4.5). The world was created not only for me to enjoy it (as the statement is sometimes interpreted to mean) but in order to make my very existence feasible.
61. Indeed, this capacity to exact accountability is one of the essential expressions of his being a bearer of the divine image.
62. Indeed, this accountability goes beyond my contemporaneous fellow-man. In terms of the first consideration it is extended to my fellow-man who is to exist in the future (though not to my fellow-man who existed in the past); for what I do to nature impinges on whether or not he would have the possibility of existing in the future. In terms of the second consideration, however, it is extended not only to my fellow-man in the future but also my fellow-man in the past; for the vocation of realizing the goal of creation, i.e., redemption, belongs to all the generations of man and the dead have a continued stake in the fulfillment of this vocation.