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Discussion
Uriel Tal

Question:
Is the differentiation you suggested between social and political theology not due to the diaspora existence in which the political dimension is abrogated?

Answer:
Following those trends in current theology I mentioned before, concepts such as "Civil Religion" by Jurgen Moltmann, "Prophetic Authority" by Johann B. Metz and also according to socio-religious studies such as Thomas Garth McBride: Christian Ethics and Economics; Werner Osypka: Arbeit and Eigentum, and Edwin G. Kaiser, C.PP.S., Theology of Work, the realm of politics is by no means confined to statehood. Politics is but one of the forms of social reality to be found in society as such, not only in the state. It was Martin Buber in his "Society and State" (1951) who emphasized that the element of power should be concentrated in society as well, not in the state only, lest the state become too powerful. Nathan Rotenstreich in: Power and its Mould — An Essay on Political Philosophy (Jerusalem: 1963) taught that indeed true freedom, based on rational and critical autonomy, is only possible if the political responsibility rests on man and society, not on the state only. Against this background we may better understand that Diaspora Jewry, being a society, has never been devoid of the political dimension. As every social structure, Diaspora Jewry functioned in the past (cf. answer to Question No. 2) and is still functioning in the present in power structures and sociopolitical interrelations (cf. Marshall Sklare and Joseph Greenblum: Jewish Identity on the Suburban Frontier (New York and London: 1967); Charles S. Liebman: The Ambivalent American Jew (Philadelphia: 1973); Daniel J. Elazar: Community and Polity — The Dynamics of American Jewry (Philadelphia: 1976).
The differentiation between social and political theology suggested by us is, therefore, not due to the Diaspora existence versus that of the state of Israel, for as we have seen, the political dimension is present in every social structure, in society as well as in state, in the Diaspora as well as in Israel. The difference between the Diaspora and Israel is rather to be found in the form of political function, not in the political dimension as such. Accordingly the political responsibility of the Jew in the Diaspora is that of a minority — that of the Israeli is one of a majority; the first is partial, the latter is total, hence in principle, a socio-political responsibility of sovereign autonomy.

Question:
The substitution of social theology for political 50theology you have suggested was based upon the rabbinic tradition, which exactly reflects the reality that characterizes Judaism from the destruction of the temple to the re-establishement of the state. This means the period in which statehood was abrogated and Judaism therefore did not have the possibility of expressing itself in terms of political power. Must we not therefore conclude that it was because of this contingent state of affairs that Jewish theology in this post-biblical period was social theology rather than political theology? Or do you want to substitute social for political theology in principle and argue that the structure of faith in Judaism is such that statehood as the full expression of the dimension of power is rejected?

Answer:
The answer to this question is a continuation of the preceding one. Historically and actually speaking, Judaism from the destruction of the temple to the reestablishment of the state has not been devoid of political power nor was Judaism deprived of the possibility of expressing itself in terms of political power. The studies by Salo W. Baron, such as The Jewish Community (III Vols. 3rd impression, Philadelphia: 1948), as well as those by Louis Finkelstein, Israel Heilperin, Ben Zion Dinur, Yitzhak Baer (cf. Uriel Tal, "Structures of Fellowship and Community in Judaism" in Conservative Judaism N.Y.: 1974) have shown that Jews lived in several parts of the Diaspora as political and communal entities among the nations, or, as Jakob Katz pointed out, as a state in the state. Jewish self-government in medieval and late-medieval times, sometimes until the second half of the 18th century (in Central and Eastern Europe) fulfilled many functions usually belonging to the state, but not such functions as warfare. Political and diplomatic representation, communal, fiscal and juridical administration, socioeconomic organization, taxation, guilds, education, social work, elections to communal and intercommunal councils (usually limited to the major contributors to communal taxation), the maintenance of the synagogue and of institutions of learning, the relief of the poor, the upkeep of burial grounds, the support of newly-married couples, socio-moral supervision . . . in short, it was the rather extensive governmental authority of a religio-communal minority that characterized Jewish life in several parts of the Diaspora. Hence the analysis suggested in our paper reflects the historical reality in Judaism according to which political power was but a part of the fabric of social life, of social responsibility, hence also, of the ethical commitment of the individual — as both man and citizen.

Question:
When you describe social theology in terms derived from symbolism, dialectics and existential experience, what happens to the halal* tradition?

Answer:
The halahic tradition is by no means devoid of symbolism, dialectics and existential experience, on the contrary, the exegetical development of the Halahah is structured, among others, in these forms of cognition and faith. Ephraim E. Urbach, in his essay "The Religious Significance of the Halaha" (in: On Judaism and Education, Hebrew University, School of Education, Jerusalem: 1967) has clearly shown that the halahic framework in which Jewish social theology grew indeed reflected and actually shaped Jewish existential experience. One of the structural forms through which this function is carried out by the law is, as we have pointed out in our paper, the differentiation between migpatim, the statutes and the huqim, the ordinances (cf. T.B. Yoma p. 67/b). "Statutes" are rules which form part of revelation, but which human wisdom too could have discovered and made obligatory, such as the prescriptions against idol worship, shedding of blood and robbery. "Ordinances" on the other hand are rules which are likewise part of revelation, but whose purpose is not inevitably derivable, such as the prescription against eating pork or wearing cloth made of mixed fibres. Our interpretation of a social theology, therefore, is rooted in the realm of "Statutes", i.e. of values that can be interpreted as being derived from both revelation and reason.

Question:
Is the interpretation, which you suggested, of kosher food in terms of its moral significance of purifying man rather than of limiting him to a way of slaughtering an animal, similar to Paul's interpretation of muzzling an ox in 1 Cor. 9:9?

Answer:
It seems that the answer to this question should be divided into two parts. As to the allegorical method used by Paul, there is here a similarity between the midrash on Psalm 18:31 in Genesis Rabba 44:1 and Tanhuma to the weekly portion "Shmini" (Lev. 9:1; 13:59), and 1 Corinthians 9:9ff. which again refers to Deut. 25:4. On the other hand, regarding the understanding of the essence of the law, there is a fundamental difference, or even contradiction, between the Jewish tradition and that derived from Paul. According to Paul, Jesus has entered this world, taking it up into himself and fulfilling the law (cf. Rom. 8:20; 12:2), while according to the Jewish conception, the law remains to be fulfilled by every individual at all times, everywhere, in all spheres of reality, including social theology.

Question:
The relation between symbolism and substance isfor Christians strongly linked to the sacramental system. This from the Catholic point of view is especially the case with the Eucharist, where we see symbol and substance in the tension towards the fulfilment and the realisation of the divine presence. We deal with water, wine and bread in a manner that takes them into new realms and relates them to us in our concrete existence, but with a thrust towards the future. Could you comment on the relation between substance and symbol in judaism as e.g. the Land or the Torah in relation to the future of man and the eschaton?

Answer:
The sacramental system, as has been correctly pointed out in this question, fulfils an essential function in the interrelationship of symbol and substance, as may be derived — if I may add a scriptural example —from John 6:53-56. Accordingly the symbol is substantial while the substance becomes symbolized, for "...he that eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, dwelleth in me and I in him". The "indwelling" in Judaism is different, just as the "manna" (Ibid. 6:58) is different, i.e. a power that gives eternal life, as compared with the material function to which it is limited in the Hebrew Bible. The indwelling, the Shehinah, symbolizes the immanence and the omnipresence of God, not his incarnation, where according to the mystical tradition in Judaism the Shehinah is a major motif in the process of unification and reconciliation, and as such fulfils a somewhat redemptive function in the economy of salvation. Essentially the Shehinah is to be found where men gather for worship, where judges sit as a court, and where even one man studies Torah (T.B. Berahoth, p. 6/a). Moreover, the Shehinah as the cosmic indwelling is everywhere (T.B. Baba Bathra, p. 25/a), and its reflection is to be found not amidst gloom, laziness, frivolity or idle talk, but in the joyful performing of the Law (T.B. Shabbath p. 30/b). Hence it would seem that indeed the dialectical tension between symbol (the spiritual form) and substance (the material being) that for example characterizes the Eucharist in Catholic tradition, is inherent in Judaism as well. Both wrestle with the problem of God's presence among men, in the world, in history and in reality; both attempt to shape time, i.e. human existence, in the light of the Divine Presence, here and now, and not only in eternity. The solution, however, is different, since for Judaism the eschatological future is not incorporated in the wine-blood and bread-body symbolism (Mk. 14:22 ff.), hence the bread can not be shared (1 Cor. 10:16-17). As to the symbol-substance dichotomy regarding the Land, see our essay: "The Land and the State of Israel in Israeli Life" in: Proceedings of the Rabbinical Assembly. Vol. XXXVIII, 1976/7, New York, pp. 1-40 (cf. French translation in SIDIC, Vol. X, No. 3, 1977, pp. 4-16); regarding the Torah and the relationship between symbol and substance, presence and the eschaton, see the enlightening exposition of Rabbi Louis Jacobs in A Jewish Theology, Berman House, New York: 1973, pp. 211-230.