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The link between People, Land and Religion in Modern Jewish Thought
Manfred Vogel

 

The task of this paper is to survey modern Jewish thought with regard to its conception of the peoplehood of Israel and the land of Israel, and further to see how these categories fit into the general understanding of the phenomenon of Judaism given in the respective formulations. That is, besides merely describing and classifying the various conceptions of Jewish peoplehood and the land of Israel, we also want to examine these conceptions and see how they fit into the conception of Judaism in the respective formulations. Is the conception which is presented of the peoplehood of Israel or the land of Israel consistent with the structure of Judaism that is given? Do they flow from the inner logic of the structure of Judaism that is given? In short, we want to see whether the conceptions of the peoplehood of Israel or the land of Israel that are given are arbitrary or determined by extraneous reasons, or whether they flow necessarily from the conception of Judaism that underlies them. This is quite an undertaking and all that we can hope to accomplish here is merely to survey, in a rather generalized manner, some of the main trends in modern Jewish thought. We cannot possibly hope to present here a thorough and detailed analysis of this wide and difficult subject.

In preparing our review and analysis, we covered five different trends which in our judgment seemed to represent the most interesting and central trends within modern Jewish thought. They are: 1) The philosophical-theological trend, in the strict sense of the term, of the nineteenthand twentieth centuries. We mean by this those writings which are systematically philosophic-theological in nature rather than publicistic or ideological. This trend expresses itself primarily within German Jewry (e.g., Lazarus, Hirsch, Steinheim, Formstecher, Cohen, Rosenzweig).

2) The Zionist ideological trend. This literature actually divides itself into two subdivisions: a) the writings of political Zionism (e.g., Herzl, Nordau, Zangwill) and b) the writings of cultural, spiritual Zionism (e.g., Ahad Ha-Am). This is the main fork in the road within Zionist literature, and the distinction between them is usually characterized by the fact that the question for political Zionism is the problem of the Jews while for cultural Zionism it is the problem of Judaism. This is a catchy formulation and up to a point valid but may not be the most fundamental. For the problem of Judaism and the problem of the Jews are intimately linked and the problem of one is the problem of the other. A more basic distinction may lie, as we would try to suggest below, in the scope of ethnicity accorded to Jewish people in these two alternatives.

3) The culturalist autonomist trend (e.g., Dub-now). This trend is, in a way, but the other side of the coin of the cultural, spiritual Zionist trend.

The two trends grasp the phenomenon of Judaism in essentially the same way. The fundamental difference between them is that the former affirms exclusive diaspora-existence while the latter sees a need for a settlement in the land of Israel. 4) The socialistic trend, namely, the literature concerned with the socialist question, where the Jewish question enters the picture within this underlying context. This trend divides itself, in turn, between those socialistic formulations that are Zionist (e.g., M. Hess) and those which are virulently anti-Zionist and diaspora-affirming (e. g., the Bund). 5) Lastly, we propose to look at the mystical trend. Namely, we would like to examine some expressions in modern Jewish thought that may be legitimately characterized as mystical formulations of Judaism. Here again, further sub-division may be introduced. Of course, a case can be made that in a profound sense all mystical formulations are religious. But taking the specific rabbinic, orthodox expression as the criterion of religiousness, a sub-division may be introduced between those formulations that adhere to the orthodox religiousness (e.g., Rav Kook) and those formulations which vis-a-vis orthodox religiousness must be characterized as non-religious (e.g., A.D. Gordon, M. Buber).*

Clearly, given this assignment, we cannot help but deal with the material in generalizations. This is a dangerous undertaking, but we have no alternative. Perhaps in the discussion we would be able to get down to specifics and a closer examination of the various thinkers. With these brief introductory remarks let me plunge into the subject matter. I propose to deal with the category of Jewish peoplehood and the category of the land together in as much as the position taken on one impinges on the position taken on the other. I will try to see if the positions taken flow from the inner logic of the formulations, i.e., from the fundamental understanding of what constitutes the essential structure of Judaism. In the conclusion I will try to give an evaluation, for better or for worse, from the vantage point of my understanding of what constitutes the essential structure of Judaism, in its distinctive form, and how it impinges on the category of peoplehood and the category of land.

All authentic expressions, formulations of Judaism will incorporate the category of Jewish peoplehood at least in the minimal sense of a distinct collectivity. This, of course, is not to say that there were no formulations by Jews that denied the category of Jewish peoplehood altogether; but in doing this, such formulations denied equally the general category of peoplehood as such affirming only one indivisible unitary category, i.e., the category of mankind. Such formulations were entertained, for example, by certain Jews in the Communist camp. But such formulations cannot, by any stretch of the imagination be taken as authentic expressions of Judaism. At best, they can be taken as the expressions of the pathology of modern Judaism. Formulations that can be taken as authentic expressions of Judaism must, no matter how minimally, affirm the reality of the phenomenon of Judaism. And such affirmation necessitates, in turn, the affirmation of the category of Jewish peoplehood, at least in the minimal sense that it constitutes a distinct collectivity. For without a collective human carrier the phenomenon of Judaism could not manifest itself in reality, indeed, could not have a reality. Judaism as a body of tenets or a body of beliefs or a pattern of behaviour or whatever else one may want to describe Judaism as, cannot have reality unless it is carried by a human collectivity. Thus, for any affirmation of Judaism and therefore for any expression of Judaism, the category of Jewish peoplehood must in some sense be affirmed also.

FORMULATIONS OF PEOPLEHOOD AND LAND

Thus, the problem before us is not whether the category of Jewish peoplehood is affirmed in the expressions of modern Judaism or not. Rather, it is the question of how the category of Jewish peoplehood is conceived and understood. Here, three possible formulations suggest themselves. First, Jewish peoplehood can be conceived as a purely religious community, a « church » completely devoid of any national character. Secondly, Jewish peoplehood can be understood as an ethnic entity, namely, as a national entity, in the full sense of the term, thus including not only the cultural, spiritual dimension. Third and lastly, Jewish peoplehood canbe understood as an ethnic entity in a restricted sense of being limited only to the cultural, spiritual dimension.

With regard to the second and third possibilities it should be noted that they can be formulated either within a religious context or within a secularized context. Namely, the category of Jewish peoplehood either in the full or in the restricted sense of ethnicity can be seen as an instrument within the religious scheme of things, i.e., as an agent in the workings of redemption; as such, the nation is seen integrally and by its very essence, as a holy nation. Or the category of Jewish peoplehood can be seen in purely naturalistic, humanistic terms as a nation like all the other nations without a religious vocation that constitutes its very essence. Although the battle between the religious and the secularized view was severe and is of great significance, we cannot enter it here in detail. Indeed for our immediate concern here it carries no importance since both the religious and secularist views agree in terms of the constitution of the category of Jewish peoplehood (and this is the question that concerns us here). Where they disagree is with regard to the question of the status of this category (its ethnicity taken either in a full or in a restricted sense) within the whole scheme of things. Suffice it here perhaps to say that for the religious view the category of peoplehood is taken as a means, as an instrument in the realization of the religious vocation and therefore the category receives its meaning and significance, its rationale, from the religious end which it serves, whereas in the secularized view the category of peoplehood is taken as the end in itself, as the primary datum, and therefore the justification and rationale for the category are derived from the primary biological urge and right of every nation's desire to go on perpetuating itself. I may add that while in the last analysis either formulation may be theoretically acceptable as a vantage point from which to understand the phenomenon of Judaism, accepting the secularist formulation would raise for me existentially a serious problem in justifying Jewish history, namely, it would be very difficult for me to justify the perseverance of the people in maintaining their Jewish identity at the cost of such suffering and abnormal conditions of living for so long a time, for the mere sake of maintaining yet another secularized ethnic entity, or because of satisfying the biological urge of self-perpetuation. Nor am I sure that such a secularized formulation can provide me with the rationale and justification for my decision to have my progeny remain within Jewish ethnicity.

Likewise with regard to the category of land there are in principle three possible stances that can be taken vis-a-vis this question. One stance would maintain that the category of land is not required for the survival or functioning of Judaism. Judaism is a purely spiritual entity, a religious, or a cultural phenomenon that can function and survive without attachment to the land, any land. A second stance would maintain that Judaism does indeed require the category of land but that there is no specific geographical location that is required. Any land, any geographic location, will satisfy the requirements of the phenomenon of Judaism. The third and last stance would maintain that the phenomenon of Judaism requires a specific land, a specific geographic location, namely the land of Israel. The full, optimal functioning of the phenomenon of Judaism requires the specific geographic location known as the land of Israel.

PEOPLEHOOD AS RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY

All of these possible formulations (the three or rather five relating to Jewish peoplehood and the three relating to the land) find expression within modern Jewish thought. Let us proceed according to the formulations relating to the category of Jewish peoplehood and corresponding with this deal with the formulations relating to the category of land. Thus, the first formulation, i.e., the formulation perceiving Jewish people-hood as purely a religious community, is reflectedin the maximal assimilationist trend within Judaism and although it might well have been quite widespread and popular among emancipated, assimilated Western Jewry, it is not really a serious option either in terms of the structure of Judaism or in terms of its reality in the world. Indeed, it does not find significant expression within the more serious, thoughtful literature. We shall, therefore, not dwell upon it here. Of course with such understanding of Jewish peoplehood it is clear that the only formulation regarding the category of land that is feasible here is a formulation that radically negates the need of Judaism for land. Jewish peoplehood as a pure, spiritualized religious community (often the religion here is nothing else than an idealized utopian but commonplace individual ethic) clearly needs no land. It should be clear that such formulations serve nicely the desire for full assimilation by removing all factors that may be obstacles to such full assimilation.

If we are to present this formulation in some greater length, we might be well advised to do it with regard to an expression that while preserving the essential view of this formulation nonetheless argues passionately for the reality and preservation of Jewish nationhood. I refer to Smolensky (prior to his conversion to Hibbat Zion). Smolensky is the father of the notion that the Jewish people is a « spiritual nation ». Jewish peoplehood is seen as carrying a special spiritual teaching, we might even say religious teaching, and whose vocation is to spread this teaching among the nations of the world. It is by virtue of this special religious, spiritual teaching that the distinctiveness of the Jewish nation is constituted and maintained. This distinctiveness is seen as long-lasting, indeed, for all intents and purposes a permanent distinctiveness. For the distinctiveness of the Jewish people will be maintained as long as the world at large has not appropriated this teaching, and the occurrence of this event, if it takes place at all, is placed in the remote future. Conceived in this way, i.e., as a completely spiritual religious entity, the Jewish peoplehood has no need for a land or a state or even a national language. As such, of course, Smolensky wants to argue that the distinctiveness of the Jewish people should not constitute an obstacle for their full emancipation, i.e., participation in the social, political, and economic life of the host nation. Since the distinctiveness is constituted exclusively by a spiritual factor and the concrete factors of distinction like land, language, and state are not applicable, there is no reason for the Jews not to adopt the concrete dimensions of national life like language, land, etc. of their host nation. The Jews are a nation but a spiritual nation, a nation not of this world. Thus, in terms of this world the factor of nationhood does not enter the picture. In terms of this worldly emancipation, the Jews can be fully emancipated. Yet this emancipation would not obliterate their distinctiveness which comes about by virtue of their being a distinct spiritual entity. Whether this formulation is valid is a different question. What is interesting and most important, however, is that although the formulation here conceives the Jewish people as a religious, spiritual community and therefore should really be understood as a collectivity of individuals sharing the same vocation, Smolensky insists on the ethnic, national nature of the entity. Namely, it is a biological group that is entrusted with this vocation, in turn imparting this vocation to its individual members. Smolensky attacks viciously Jewish enlightenment precisely on the point that it abrogated and canceled the dimension of peoplehood in its understanding of Judaism. The giving up of the category of nationhood by Jewish enlightenment (Mendelssohn) signaled the death-knell for Jewish survival. Clearly in Smolensky's view there can be no requirement for land.

PEOPLEHOOD AS ETHNIC ENTITY

The second formulation, on the other hand, i.e., the formulation perceiving Jewish people-hood as an ethnic entity in the full sense of theterm, is a most significant and important expression. Still, it is primarily limited to certain quarters of the Zionist ideological trend, specifically, the trend of political Zionism. Although numerically this formulation may not find a wide expression, it is an extremely important formulation in terms of the practical destiny of the Jewish people in our time and (as we will try to argue at the end) because it captures and represents an essential aspect of the structure of the phenomenon of Judaism when this phenomenon is taken in its distinctiveness and, I believe, in its authenticity. The importance of these formulations cannot be decided on a quantitative basis.

1. Leon Pinsker

A good example of this formulation will be the view expressed by Pinsker in his Auto-emancipation (his view, though by no means identical, is very similar in many respects to that of Herzl in his Judenstaat). True to the orientation of political Zionism, the question for Pinsker is the problem of the Jewish people rather than of Judaism. The problem is the problem of anti-Semitism, which for him, in contradistinction to Herzl, is not a modern problem but a problem as old as Jewish diasporaexistence. In his analysis, such factors as economic competition and social incompatibility do not constitute the essence of the problem of anti-Semitism. They are secondary factors aggravating the problem, but not its source. The primary essential factor bringing about anti-Semitism is the fact that the Jewish nation is perceived as a ghost nation. In its diaspora-existence it is perceived as a separate distinct entity, as a nation, and yet it is unlike any other nation known to mankind. It is not concretely a nation, merely a ghost of a nation. And deeply seated within the soul of man there is a primal fear of ghosts, of anything that is ghost-like. Such fear easily links itself with feelings of hatred and mockery, and the constellation of such emotions constitutes the phenomenon of anti-Semitism. And the Jewish nation in its diaspora-existence is ghostlike because it does not have its own homeland. Many other people dwell as strangers in other lands, but their condition is not the same as that of the Jews because they have a homeland some place. The Jew, therefore, is not a stranger in other lands, but a ghost creature roaming the world. Emancipation, therefore, will not work; it is bound to fail. The only solution is for the Jews to regain a homeland for themselves. Auto-emancipation in the sense of regaining national sovereignty is the solution.

Clearly the understanding of Jewish people-hood reflected in this analysis is that of an ethnic group in the full sense of the term. The Jews are ghost-like because their ethnicity is not expressed in this-worldly terms. They are strange and unlike any other nation because they do not possess their own land and as such allow their ethnicity to express itself in the political dimension.

Given this understanding of Jewish people-hood as an ethnic entity in the full sense of the term, it is clear that the formulation which rejects the need for land will be inapplicable here. Such a formulation of Jewish peoplehood can be consistently combined only with a formulation that requires the appropriation of land for that people. If the Jewish people is to express itself in the political dimension, it must have political sovereignty. The expression of political sovereignty, however, is the possession of statehood. And statehood can be established only with reference to a specific geographic location. Thus the realization of the political dimension requires of necessity the possession of some land. The inner logic of the formulation which perceives Jewish peoplehood as an ethnic entity in the full sense of the term requires the formulation that argues for the need of the Jewish people having a land of their own. But the inner logic of this formulation does not require that this land will be specifically the land of Israel. What is needed is some land so that statehood can be established and it is the establishment of statehood that is vitally needed by the Jewish people. In principle, in theory, any land will serve that purpose. As such, the territorialists or the Ugandists were indeed consistent. In reality, however, their position did not hold, and most of them veered towards the requirement of the land of Israel specifically. That is, not just any geographic location would do but only, specifically, the geographic location that is the land of Israel. However, the reasons for the requirement for the specific geographic location that is the land of Israel did not follow from the inner logic of the formulation but rather from extraneous considerations such as the historical connection, the emotional attachment and pragmatic considerations. Because of these considerations (and these considerations, though extraneous in terms of their inner logic, are of utmost importance in terms of the realities of life), the preponderance of the formulations that perceived Jewish peoplehood as an ethnic entity in the full sense of the term linked themselves to the requirement for a specific geographic location, i.e., the requirement for the land of Israel specifically.

This understanding of Jewish peoplehood in its full ethnicity, and commensurately therefore the need for a land, arises out of the problematic of Jewish existence. A similar understanding of Jewish peoplehood and the need for a land arises also in the context of socialism. That is, the fulfillment of the socialist program seen in connection with the question of Judaism and the Jewish people, leads to an understanding of Jewish peoplehood in its full ethnicity and to the need for a land. Thus within the Zionist trend there was an important expression that derived its stance from considerations emanating from the socialist orientation. But the most interesting illustration of this position may be found perhaps in a thinker who is really a precursor of the Zionist movement. This is Moses Hess. In Hess we find a most intriguing philosophic expression for this stance.

2. Moses Hess

Moses Hess in Rome and Jerusalem clearly grasped the significance of the category of Jewish peoplehood within the context of socialist thought. He had the genius to perceive that the category of peoplehood is the necessary and inescapable matrix for the expression of social relations and even more penetrating was his insight that the maximal expression of social relations requires the category of peoplehood in the sense of full ethnicity, i.e., the category of peoplehood that implies not only the cultural, spiritual dimension, but equally and essentially the economic-political dimension. Seeing the Jewish people as charged by its vocation to fulfill the socialist ideal, he grasped the Jewish people as a full, all-encompassing ethnic group. And being grasped as an ethnic group in the full sense of the term, the Jewish people in order to fulfill its vocation, i.e., to fulfill the socialist ideal, requires sovereignty, i.e., the machinery of a state. And this in turn requires that the Jewish people be concentrated in a certain geographic location. The inner logic of his stance should have been satisfied with any particular geographic location, for a geographic location is required solely for the establishment of a state, i.e., sovereignty, so that the ethnic group can express itself in the economic-political dimension. And any geographic location would lend itself for this purpose. But it is at this point that the romantic side of Hess enters the picture and historical memory and emotional attachment exercise their influence leading Hess to require the restoration of the Jewish people through its ancient homeland in the land of Israel. Thus he requires specifically the return of the Jewish people to the land of Israel rather than their establishment of a state in any other particular geographic location.

ETHNIC ENTITY IN RESTRICTED SENSE

The third formulation, namely, the formulation that views Judaism within a limited ethnic context, i.e., excluding the political dimension, isthe most widespread formulation. This is understandable on extraneous grounds. That is, this formulation is the formulation that would be the most congenial to emancipated Jewry in diaspora. For, on the one hand, the formulation does not run head-on against the reality of the Jewish phenomenon in the past, a reality whereby the Jewish people always understood itself and was understood by others as a distinct, separate group of an ethnic nature. Nor does it fly in the face of the present reality where the Jewish entity continues to be distinct not only as a religious community but as an ethnic entity (although in the present many Jews might not want to accept this reality). This formulation, therefore (in contradistinction to the formulation which sees the Jewish peoplehood as merely a « church »), precludes the necessity of making the preposterous claim that ethnically the Jewish people are one and the same as the host nation. The formulation does grasp the distinction as ethnic and as such it grasps the distinction authentically, i.e., in accordance with reality. On the other hand, however, it does not radicalize this distinction by including the political dimension within the ethnic formulation. By leaving out the political dimension it allows an ethnically distinct Jewish people to go on living within the political context belonging to another ethnic group. Thus it can serve very conveniently as a rationale for the half-way existence of emancipated diaspora Jewry, an existence which wants to be both separate and distinct from the host nation and at the same time included within the social, economic, and political life of the host nation. (Whether such a situation as envisioned by this formulation is feasible is another question.)

1. Within religious context

As has been said, this formulation is widely expressed in modern Jewish thought. Thus, in the context of the religious interpretation of Jewish peoplehood, it is widely expressed within the philosophic-theological trend formulated by German Jewry (of course the religious understanding here is not the rabbinic, halakhic understanding, but we would not want to limit the religious understanding of Judaism and Jewish peoplehood so restrictively that only the rabbinic, halakhic understanding would qualify as religious). Jewish peoplehood is grasped here as the carrier of the religious vocation and in this capacity it is grasped as of limited ethnicity. And it can be so grasped, i.e., grasped as being of limited ethnicity, because the religious vocation of which it is the carrier is formulated here in one of two contexts neither of which is understood as implicating the political dimension.

One of these contexts is the ethical (this context was, of course, shaped under the marked influence of Kant's philosophy). The vocation of the religion of Judaism is seen here as essentially nothing else but the realization of the ethical. The ethical refers, of course, to the relations between man and man, and as such, it is understandable that Jewish peoplehood be the carrier of a vocation so understood in as much as the category of peoplehood provides the matrix for the relations between man and man. But the ethical here is essentially confined to the relations between individuals and is not extended to cover the political dimension, i.e., the relations characterizing collectivities of individuals; ethics of politics is not available here. As such, the category of Jewish peoplehood which is the carrier of this non-political ethical vocation need not be ethnic in the full sense of the term, but can be ethnic in a limited sense. (Whether with a vocation of such individualized ethics the category of peoplehood rather than a mere association of individuals is, in the last analysis, really required, is a different question.) Hermann Cohen and Leo Baeck may serve as good examples of this kind of formulation.

The other context is the metaphysical. The religious vocation is conceived here as the realization of another realm of existence, and the category of Jewish peoplehood is seen as an instrument in the realization of this vocation. A good example may be Franz Rosenzweig. The religious vocation here, in the last analysis, isthe realization of existence outside of the flux of time and history — existence in eternity. The vocation of the Jewish people is to carry the presentiment of such an existence within the flux of history.

For such a task the category of Jewish people-hood does not have to be taken as ethnic in the full sense of the term. Indeed, Jewish people-hood in the full sense of the term would not do. For the political dimension is part and parcel of the flux of time and history. Possessing the political dimension thus means being involved, in a positive and affirmative sense, in the flux of history. Being ethnic in the full sense is thus necessarily an affirmation and a furthering of the flux. But the vocation here is precisely the ultimate negation of the flux. True, one exists passively for the time being within the flux, but the pointing, the vocation is to that which negates it. The category of ethnicity which implicates the political dimension must be rejected. It is only the category of ethnicity in the limited sense that can be used in such a scheme of things. (Here too it is questionable whether even ethnicity in the limited sense is really required in terms of the inner logic of the formulation; whether such a scheme of things is not really in the last analysis individualistic, requiring at best an association of individuals, a « church » rather than the category of ethnic peoplehood.)

In view of this it should not be surprising that most of the formulations within this trend, both in the ethical context and in the metaphysical context, consciously reject the political dimension in their formulation of Jewish ethnicity. Thus most of them are strenuously opposed to political Zionism. They see in the inclusion of the political dimension a secularization of the vocation of Jewish peoplehood. By including the political dimension the Jewish people would become like all the other nations, and the purity and uniqueness of its religious vocation would be undermined. It is true that such a danger exists, but it is not true, as these formulations nevertheless imply, that such a danger will of necessity be actualized.

Commensurate with this understanding of the category of Jewish peoplehood, the various formulations of the philosophical-theological trend do not express any appreciation for the requirement of the category of land; indeed, they expressly reject it. Most of its representatives, for example, Steinheim, Formstecher, Hirsch, Lazarus, Cohen, Rosenzweig, and others, rejected the category of land. Within their respective representations of the structure of Judaism, the category of land is for all intents and purposes not present. This is in stark contradistinction to the central place given to the category of history. Actually this is quite understandable, for this trend of modern Jewish thought grasps the essence of Judaism as lying either in the ethical but non-political ethical or in the metaphysical domain. In either case the category of land would not be significant in such a scheme of things. The domain of ethics does not require space but time. Ethical relations are realized in time and not space. Thus, if the essential vocation of Judaism is the realization of the ethical, the working towards the bringing about of this realization would require history but not land. And since it is non-political ethics that we have here, there is no requirement for statehood which, in turn, would have required the category of land. It certainly does not require any specific land for the working towards the realization of the ethical as, indeed, its realization is universal. The domain of the ethical is by its very essence universal and cannot recognize and appreciate any particularity. Similarly, with the formulations of Judaism that see the essential vocation of Judaism as lying in the metaphysical domain. Here the essential vocation of Judaism is seen to lie in the transcending of this worldly spacial-temporal flux. Judaism deals here with the realm of the beyond and as such a realm in which the category of land has no role to play.

2. Within secularized context

The restricted ethnic formulation can also be found formulated in a non-religious context, i.e.,in a secularized context. Here, Jewish people-hood is seen as the carrier of a national cultural heritage like any other nation. This cultural heritage may, of course, have its special contribution to make, but the existence of the Jewish people, its special contribution, its raison d'etre are conceived with no reference to a divine cosmic working of salvation. The religious grounding is removed. It is conceived purely in horizontal terms with no vertical reference. This formulation can be encountered in the context of socialism. That is the vocation of the Jewish people and the significance of its heritage is taken to be the bringing about of secularized social justice. The Jewish people becomes the instrument in the realization of secularized socialism.

But the Jewish people is taken here, in contradistinction to the instance above exemplified by Hess, in a restricted ethnic sense which means that it does not possess its own political dimension. Rather, it contributes its ideals of social justice to the political dimension of the host nation. It participates in the political dimension of the host nation. As such it is a view of Jewish peoplehood in a socialist context which affirms diaspora existence. We find it expressed, for example, in the Bundist formulation. Thus, within the context of socialism we get not only a formulation that grasps Jewish people-hood in its full ethnicity, and that correspondingly requires the category of land, but also a formulation that grasps Jewish peoplehood in a limited ethnic sense and which correspondingly denies the category of land.

Another secularized formulation within this context of restricted ethnicity is known by the name of autonomism and is associated with the name of the famous Jewish historian Dubnow. It has links with the socialist context though it is not essentially formulated within this context. Rather can it be seen as an outgrowth of the formulation by Smolensky given above. What we have here is a reduction of the extremely spiritualized conception of Judaism in Smolensky.

The extreme abstractness of Judaism is concretized. The religious is secularized. In Smolensky Judaism is essentially but a system of abstract tenets and teaching. Here Judaism is a system of more concrete cultural patterns and values; it is much less of an other-worldly entity here. Indeed it is very much within the horizontal, this-worldly context.

As such, it is not possible for this formulation to take the position that Smolensky takes regarding the possibility, and indeed the desirability, of the complete assimilation of the Jew in his host nation. Smolensky could take this position in as much as for him Judaism was completely spiritualized and other-worldly and consequently could not constitute an obstacle to an assimilation that is completely within a this-worldly context; nor was there any objection to such an assimilation since it could not impinge upon, i.e., weaken, the allegiance to Judaism. But in the autonomist formulation, Judaism being grasped here in a this-worldly context, such an assimilation would both be deterred by the interests of Judaism and would indeed impinge in a detrimental way upon it. Consequently, the autonomous formulation envisions Jewish existence in diaspora in the form of ethnic islands with internal autonomy lodged within the host nations. Not grasping the category of Jewish peoplehood in its full ethnicity, i.e., including the political dimension, it does not require a specific national homeland and the full sovereignty of the state for the Jewish nation. Instead, it affirms diaspora-existence. But to protect the cultural distinctiveness of Jewish peoplehood it wants to introduce not a political, territorial division but a cultural, spiritual division. The result is its proposal for internal cultural autonomy for the Jewish people exercised on the land, and within the political framework, of other nations.

It is also in this context of viewing the Jewish peoplehood as a restricted ethnic entity, i.e., a cultural ethnic entity (leaving out the political dimension), that the formulation of a very important and influential thinker, Ahad Ha Am, belongs. For Ahad Ha-Am Judaism is a cultural rather than a political entity. It is a system of values and patterns of living, essentially a system of ethical values and teachings. As such, the entity that is its human carrier, i.e., the category of Jewish peoplehood, is commensurately perceived as an ethnic group that is ethnic in the limited sense of being cultural. Perceiving the category of Jewish peoplehood in the restricted ethnic sense, Ahad Ha-Am can and indeed does in the last analysis affirm diaspora existence. Granted, such an existence is problematic in our time, given the circumstances of emancipation of the Jewish people. The problem for Ahad Ha-Am, however, is not the possibility of the survival of the Jews, but rather the possibility of the survival of Judaism under these circumstances. His diagnosis and solution, however, do not negate the possibility and desirability of the ongoing existence of the Jewish people and Judaism in diaspora. Indeed, diaspora-existence for him is an inescapable fact of Jewish reality. If Judaism and the Jewish people are to survive, a solution must be found for their ongoing, continued diaspora existence. The possibility of redeeming the entirety of the Jewish people and of Judaism from diaspora existence and constituting the entirety, or even the majority, of the Jewish nation in its own homeland did not seem realistic to him. Thus, in the last analysis he too remains an affirmer of diaspora-existence. He differs, however, from the formulation of autonomism in that he does not believe that under the circumstances envisioned by the formulation of autonomism Judaism could have enough strength and vitality to withstand the influences of the foreign culture of the host nations and thus have the necessary strength to preserve the Jewish people in their distinctiveness. His formulation calls, therefore, for a concentration of part of the Jewish people in their own homeland where they would constitute a majority and where, therefore, danger of foreign influence would be greatly reduced. In such a homeland the strengths and vitality of Judaism can be revived and then "exported", so to speak, to the bulk of the Jewish people living in diaspora, thus strengthening their Judaism and insuring the survival and even prosperity in the circumstances of diaspora existence.

The geographic location for the constitution of such a center, such a national home, for a part of the Jewish people is for Ahad Ha-Am the land of Israel. In this sense he is a Zionist. Now there is no denying that the inner logic of his formulation does, indeed, require a specific geographic location, a land, for the survival of Judaism and the Jewish people under the modern circumstances of emancipation. For Judaism and the Jewish people to survive in modern circumstances, part of the people must be concentrated as a majority in a national home. And such a concentration in a national home requires a specific geographic location. But why specifically the land of Israel as the specific geographic location? The revival and strengthening of Judaism depends not on the specific geographic location but rather on the fact that in it there would be a concentration, a majority, of the Jewish people. It is the fact that the Jewish people will constitute a majority in a certain specific geographic location that is essential in terms of the inner logic of his formulation, rather than where such a concentration would take place. Choice of the land of Israel, it would seem, is thus determined here not by the inner logic of the formulation but rather by extraneous considerations such as historical memory and emotional attachment. In terms of the inner logic of the formulation, the concentration of a part of the Jewish people as a majority in some place like Argentina, Africa or any place else in the world should be as satisfactory and efficacious as its concentration in the land of Israel.

MYSTICAL TREND

So far we did not include the mystical trend. The reason is that the mystical trend is reallyseparate from the other trends. All the other trends were formulations of Judaism in a mainly this-worldly context. They were essentially horizontally oriented. (The only exception is the metaphysical formulation in the philosophic-theological trend, e.g., Rosenzweig, which indeed is in many respects of our analysis here similar to the mystical trend.) Thus I thought it might be more convenient to consider the mystical trend in itself. Here the religious mystical orientation is expressed most prominently by Rav Kook, and the non-religious orientation by A. D. Gordon ( though in a way, being mystical, it is really also religious in a broader sense of the term). In both, the category of Jewish peoplehood is affirmed. In both, the category of land, indeed, specifically the land of Israel, is affirmed. And it is interesting that in both, the two categories follow from the inner logic, i.e., from the premises of their system. We say interesting because one would expect that within a mystical formulation there would be no room for the particularity of peoplehood or of land.

The mystical world view would seem to operate in terms of the individual rather than in terms of the ethnic entity. This could be clearly seen if one were to contrast the structure of Judaism as an ethical vocation, where the requirement for the ethnic entity is very clear, with the structure of Judaism understood in the mystical context. The ethnic entity is required when the scheme of things is in terms of this world and in the context of human relationships. In the mystical formulation, on the other hand, the scheme of things is in terms of confronting the flux of this world and, indeed, transcending all division, including the division between man and fellowman, into the all-encompassing unity. There is no room for the ethnic entity in the all-encompassing unity nor is there really, in the last analysis, any role that the ethnic entity can play in bringing about this all-encompassing unity. (These considerations and arguments would also apply in the case of the metaphysical formulation of Rosenzweig, though we cannot spell this out here.)

1. Ray Kook

There is one possibility where the ethnic entity may be required by the inner logic of the mystical formulation. This is when the mechanism of bringing about the mystical salvation, i.e., the union with the One, devolves on some special powers or attributes which are determined genetically and which as such inhere in the redemptive agent.

That is, some people may be endowed with special « mystical talent » while other people are not (this would be on the analogy of some people being endowed with musical talent or with certain physical characteristics). On this basis a case can be made that the mystical vocation, function, may devolve on a certain people by virtue of the blood kinship, i.e., the genetic common pool which characterizes the ethnic entity. This, of course, introduces the biological-racial dimension into the category of ethnicity, a category which within the context of mainstream Judaism is really constituted as a historical and not as a racial category. Still, it is possible and we do encounter it in the tradition, as, for example, in Yehuda Halevi, Maharal and perhaps Kook. It is in this connection interesting to note that in Rav Kook's thought the status of Jewish peoplehood is determined not solely or even mainly by election (behira) but by an inherent special quality (segula). The Jewish people are endowed with the quality whereby the yearning for God and thus the power of transforming the profane into the sacred is more clearly expressed.

Thus the Jewish people by virtue of an innate quality is the redemptive agent in a universal, cosmic redemption. And since the redemption is envisaged here not as the separation of the holy from the profane, but rather as the transformation of the profane in its entirety into the holy, thus inclusive of the profane political dimension, the category of Jewish peoplehood is grasped here in its full ethnicity. (Here is an instance of afull political Zionist stance from a rabbinic, religious position though a mystical one.)

Likewise with the category of the land, because the redemptive agency is determined by innate quality (segula) the rationale is provided for particularity. The category of land in general is introduced because redemption includes the domain of nature. Redemption is not merely an event on the human social level, it is an event on the cosmic level. And the specific portion of land that is the land of Israel is endowed with special redemptive power, or rather, the redemptive power flows through it in a concentrated form, thus making it a redemptive agent in contra-distinction to other lands.

2. A.D. Gordon

In A. D. Gordon the category of the land in general also plays a central role because it is the shaper of nationhood (in contra-distinction to society), and nationhood, in turn, is the agency that mediates between man and nature, between man's soul and the cosmic soul. The spirit of a nation is created through contact with the cosmic spirit in a specific place, and the spirit of a nation, in turn, determines the spirit of the individual by virtue of his membership within the nation. Thus the link between a nation and its land is permanent and essential. Thus, not only is the category of land and the category of peoplehood essential and inextricable in this scheme of things, but also the particularization of land and people is provided for. For the individual Jew, redemption, in the sense of establishing full communion with the cosmic spirit, necessitates the Jewish people which, in turn, necessitates the land of Israel.

One could not ask for a tighter inner logic establishing the category of peoplehood and the category of land than is given in the thought of Kook and Gordon. But it is established on certain premises which are taken as facts, as given data, and for which no rationale is provided. Thus for Kook the particularity of Jewish peoplehood, and the land of Israel, is established on the fact of the special segula inherent in them. For Gordon it is established on the one-to-one relationship between land and nation, and the role of the nation as mediator of the cosmic spirit to the individual. If a critique is to be lodged against these formulations, then it must be lodged
at this point, i.e., questioning the validity of these premises. And these premises can be questioned seriously, both as to whether they are really required by their respective scheme of things, and whether they authentically reflect the distinctive phenomenon of Judaism.


Overview and Conclusions

INNER LOGIC OF THE FORMULATIONS ...

In conclusion let us briefly recapitulate the picture that emerges from our short and selective description of the expressions of modern Judaism regarding the categories of peoplehood and land. We have seen that all formulations affirmed the category of peoplehood. The preponderance of formulations, however, understood the category of peoplehood in terms of limited ethnicity, i.e., ethnicity exclusively in terms of ethos and culture; only some formulations understood the category of peoplehood in terms of full ethnicity, i.e., ethnicity that encompasses the social, economic and political dimensions. With regard to the category of land the consensus is not so clear. There were some formulations (and they are significant formulations that cannot be dismissed out of hand as idiosyncratic) that did not affirm the category of land. Still, the preponderance of formulations did affirm the category of land. However, with regard to the affirmation of the specific geographic location that was known as Palestine there was no unanimity. Many formulations did indeed affirm the specific geographic location that was Palestine. But there were also formulations for which the specific geographic location where the category of land was to be affirmed was of no consequence; any geographic location would do.

A much more intriguing but difficult task was to ascertain the consistency of the particular affirmations of peoplehood and land with the inner logic of the respective formulations. Still, we believe we have shown that the category of peoplehood is not only necessary in terms of the inner logic of the various formulations but is established as a primary category; the onlyexception was the case of the formulations in the mystical context where some question could be raised as to the legitimacy and necessity of affirming the category of peoplehood (at least as a historical category rather than a biological-racial category). With regard to the affirmation of the category of land the situation was much more complicated and difficult. Our conclusion was, nevertheless, that when the category of land is affirmed, it can be affirmed in terms of the inner logic only as a secondary category, i.e., a category whose affirmation is required by virtue of the needs of the category of peoplehood, the primary category, and not on its own terms. Furthermore, the affirmation of the category of land led in terms of the inner logic only as far as requiring some geographic location but not the specific geographic location that was known as Palestine (the need for the affirmation of Palestine came from historical, emotional and pragmatic considerations but not from considerations of the pure inner logic of the formulations concerned). Here again, however, formulations in the mystical context presented an exception. In terms of their inner logic the category of land and specifically Palestine was required, and indeed, required as a primary category. It is a holy land not just in name but in reality, not derivatively but directly.

Thus, if the formulations in the mystical context are left out, we can say that the inner logic operative in the remaining formulations clearly places the category of peoplehood as a primary, essential and necessary category within the structure of the phenomenon of Judaism, that it allows the entry of the category of land within this structure only as a secondary, derivative category and that, strictly in terms of the requirements of the inner logic as such (thus excluding such considerations as historical association, emotional attachment, and pragmatic feasibility, considerations which are very significant and not to be dismissed lightly but which, nonetheless, are extraneous as far as the inner logic as such is concerned), there can be no specification of the category of land, i.e., no particular geographic location, e.g., Palestine, may have preference over another.

... CORRESPONDS WITH INNER LOGIC OF JUDAISM

Now, I would want to maintain that this inner logic and specifically its delineation of the status of the categories of peoplehood and land is a true reflection of the inner logic that characterizes the distinctive religious structure that constitutes the mainstream expression of the phenomenon of Judaism. Of course, as an historical phenomenon Judaism is not monolithic; it encompasses a number of different expressions implicating different structures of faith and consequently different kinds of inner logic. Still, I would want to maintain that among these various structures there is a structure, in contradistinction to the rest, that establishes the distinctiveness of Judaism within the phenomenology of religion, that characterizes its main thrust, that can explain its history and characteristics most adequately, that indeed found a basic and widespread expression within Judaism and that, therefore, can be seen as constituting the mainstream expression of the phenomenon of Judaism. At any event, the crux of the point made here is that the inner logic of this structure delineates the same status respectively for the category of peoplehood and for the category of land that we have encountered in the non-mystical expressions of modern Jewish thought. Namely, in the structure of faith characterizing the distinctive, mainstream expression of Judaism the category of peoplehood is a primary category — essential and inextricable as far as the very existence of the phenomenon is concerned; onthe other hand, the category of land can enter the structure only as a secondary, derivative category — a category which certainly carries significance for the optimal, full realization of the phenomenon but which, nevertheless, is not essential and inextricable for its very existence (the fact that Judaism could survive in diasporaexistence is clear proof for this assertion).

1. Primacy of peoplehood

It is evidently not feasible for me to fully argue and demonstrate this claim here (it is a task for a different occasion). But if it be granted that the substance of the redemptive vocation as constituted in the distinctive, mainstream expression of Judaism is the establishment in a this-worldly context of the righteous community, then I can attempt to trace quickly the workings of the inner logic operative here as it impinges upon the categories of peoplehood and land, showing that it delineates them in the way suggested above. Thus, with regard to the category of peoplehood, it will indeed be of necessity delineated here as a primary category that is essential and irremovable. For quite clearly vis-a-vis a redemptive vocation that is the establishment of the righteous community, the category of peoplehood functions both as the principal agent in the working towards its realization and as the sole matrix in which such realization can take place. The righteous community cannot be established except in the context of the category of peoplehood, and likewise the striving towards its realization can be carried on only in those terms. The establishing of the righteous community cannot be carried out in terms of the individual qua individual, nor in terms of a collectivity that is but the association, the sum-total of individuals with a common denominator; it necessarily requires a collectivity that ontologically, if not chronologically, precedes the individual, i.e., the ethnic, national collectivity, the collectivity that in its very constitution provides the social, economic and political dimensions in whose terms only the righteous community can be established; in short, it necessarily requires the category of peoplehood.

But as such, the category of peoplehood is a category of history not of nature, and its working towards redemption as, indeed, the consummation of redemption, is in the dimension of time and not of space. The category of land, on the other hand, is a category of space, of nature. As such, it is understandable that the category of land, unlike the category of peoplehood, would not be implicated by the inner logic that is operative here, i.e., an inner logic that flows from the requirements of a redemptive vocation whose substance is the establishment of the righteous community. For the workings of the inner logic here, as traced so far, are exclusively in the temporal-historical dimension, while the category of land subsists in the spacio-natural dimension. Thus, the redemptive vocation implicates directly the category of peoplehood but not the category of land.

The category of land enters the structure of faith of Judaism secondarily and derivatively, by the category of peoplehood implicating it. That is, the category of peoplehood in order to be able to strive for the realization of the redemptive vocation and, indeed, to consummate this striving in a fulfilled realization of the redemptive vocation, needs sovereignty — it needs power to regulate its life both internally and externally. Without the possession of sovereignty, the freedom to decide and direct the life of the community, the category of peoplehood cannot possibly carry out the redemptive task assigned to it. But sovereignty, in turn, implicates the category of land. For sovereignty can be attained only by a people that possesses a land. The possession of a land is the condition sine qua non for the exercise of sovereignty (although in itself it may not be a sufficient condition, it is certainly a necessary one). Thus, the thrust of the inner logic operative here is as follows: the redemptive vocation being the establishment of the righteous community, it of necessity implicates the categoryof peoplehood; the category of peoplehood, in turn, in order to carry out and realize the redemptive task assigned to it, of necessity requires sovereignty; and sovereignty, in turn, of necessity implicates the category of land; of necessity it requires the possession of a land.

2. Land secondary but essential

Now, we must be clear and precise as to what this presentation actually says with regard to the categories of peoplehood and land. First, although the category of land is secondary and derived (and will always be so in the distinctive structure of faith of Judaism), it should be clear that as far as the redemptive vocation, i.e., the specific task of realizing redemption, is concerned the category of land is no less essential than the category of peoplehood. Without a land to allow the exercise of sovereignty, the fulfillment (and even the very workings) of the redemptive vocation is simply not possible. Where the category of land, in contra-distinction to the category of peoplehood, is not essential is with regard to the question of the capacity of the religious phenomenon of Judaism to maintain itself, i.e., to go on enduring in existence. While without the category of peoplehood the phenomenon of Judaism collapses and cannot possibly go on existing, without the category of land it can persevere and go on existing though albeit in a limping and crippled fashion. Thus, the phenomenon of Judaism did endure and survive diasporaexistence. True, it was (and indeed was perceived as such by Judaism itself) a truncated form of existence. In diaspora-existence Judaism could only mark time; it could only, so to speak, hold the fort but it could not actively pursue its redemptive vocation. For the resumption of active pursuit of its redemptive vocation it had to await and hope for its restoration to the land.

TODAY: LAND NECESSARY FOR SURVIVAL OF JUDAISM

We must add, however, that the situation has radically changed in modern times and that the assertions made above must, therefore, be qualified accordingly if they are to apply to Judaism in the modern world. Because of radical changes in the social structure of the host nations and the rise of nationalism in its modern form which, in turn, lead to a radical change in the conditions of existence of Judaism in diaspora, i.e., leading to a transformation from ghetto-existence to what is commonly called emancipation, the very possibility of the survival of Judaism in diaspora-existence is thrown into question. Evidently, we cannot analyze and expound on this thesis here (we have done it, in a way, in our essay « The Dilemma of Identity for the Emancipated Jew,» The Journal of Bible and Religion, Volume XXXIV, Number 3, July 1966). We shall state dogmatically that in the conditions of existence afforded by the modern world, for the phenomenon of Judaism to survive it must extricate itself from diaspora-existence. This means that it must regain its sovereignty, and since sovereignty is afforded only by the possession of land this means that Judaism must regain a land of its own. Thus, in the conditions of existence of the modern world or, to put the matter differently, vis-a-vis emancipated Judaism, the category of land is needed not only for the resumption of the active pursuit and the ultimate realization of the redemptive vocation but for the very existence of the phenomenon of Judaism. And of course the question of existence takes precedence over the question of pursuing the redemptive vocation, and therefore it is understandable that in the formulations we have surveyed, formulations dealing with and expressing the situation of Judaism in the modern world, the category of land is considered primarily with regard to the question of existence and not the redemptive vocation (though, of course, by regaining the land for the sake of existence the possibility to resume and ultimately realize the redemptive vocation is also given). Emancipated Judaism cannot survive in diaspora; for it the category of land is on an equal footing with the category of peoplehood — it is essential for the very existence of the phenomenon. But even so, even with regard to Judaism in the modern world, the category of land is not essential in the same sense as the category of peoplehood. For at least theoretically (though realistically it is very unlikely) Judaism can retreat from emancipation and in this eventuality the impossibility of survival in diaspora-existence is not so definite. This, in turn, means that the need for the category of land for the sake of survival is once again removed. The category of peoplehood, on the other hand, is not affected by such contingent circumstances. The need for it for the very existence of the phenomenon is permanent, determined by the very structure of the phenomenon itself and independent of all conditions of existence; the need for it will persist in all conceiveable situations.

REQUIREMENT OF LAND IN GENERAL

Secondly, it should be clear that when the inner logic operative here requires the category of land, it requires the category of land in general. It does not require any specific land to the exclusion of others. Any geographic location would satisfy the requirements of inner logic here. This applies equally to the requirement of land for the sake of pursuing and realizing the redemptive vocation and to the requirement of land in modern times for the sake of the survival of emancipated Judaism. For the need for a land arises in both instances from the need for sovereignty. And sovereignty can be provided by the possession of any land; it is common to all lands. Affording sovereignty is not an attribute possessed by certain lands to the exclusion of others. Of course, again, this is purely on the theoretical level; in reality there are other considerations which bear heavily and significantly on this question and which do indeed particularize and focus on a specific geographic location, i.e., the specific land that was known as Palestine, to the exclusion of all other geographic locations.

PEOPLEHOOD IN FULL SENSE

Thirdly and lastly, it should be clear that the category of peoplehood indicated by the inner logic operative here is of a peoplehood in the sense of full ethnicity. Clearly, since the redemptive vocation is the establishment of the righteous community, the category of peoplehood that is required is the category of peoplehood that carries the social-economic-political dimensions. The category of peoplehood in the sense of restricted ethnicity would not be capable of providing the matrix for the realization of the redemptive vocation nor, indeed, for the striving for its realization. Of course, in diaspora-existence, since the social-economic-political dimensions were not available anyway (indeed, the absence of these dimensions constitutes in essence diaspora-existence and characterizes it as a truncated existence), the formulation of the category of peoplehood in the sense of restricted ethnicity would readily suggest itself — it corresponds to, and indeed reflects, the reality of the category of peoplehood existing in these circumstances, i.e., in the conditions of diaspora-existence. Most of the formulations we have surveyed did indeed arise in the circumstances of diaspora-existence so that it is understandable that the formulation of the category of peoplehood in the sense of restricted ethnicity was so wide-spread. Also, formulating the category of peoplehood in the sense of restricted ethnicity would remove, or at least mitigate, some issues on which a potential head-on collision between the claims of the host nation and the claims of Jewish peoplehood in the sense of full ethnicity could potentially arise; as such, formulating the category of peoplehood in the sense of restricted ethnicity would be more congenial to emancipated Judaism in diaspora-existence, and it is to be expected that formulations arising in the circumstances of diaspora-existence would be disposed, even if unconsciusly, towards it. Still, in terms of the phenomenon of Judaism itself and irrespective of the contingent considerations arising fromcircumstances of diaspora-existence, the category of peoplehood that is required is the category of peoplehood in the sense of full ethnicity. Only as such can the category of peoplehood fulfill its task in the redemptive vocation and be the primary category that is essential and irremovable. The category of peoplehood in the sense of restricted ethnicity could maintain this status only in diaspora-existence when the active pursuance of the redemptive vocation of Judaism was suspended (it thus maintains this status, in a way, by default due to diaspora-existence). It can maintain this status because the function of Judaism in diaspora-existence was, as we said, merely to mark time and hold the fort. This task the category of peoplehood in the sense of restricted ethnicity could fulfill — it could keep the ethnic identity (i.e., thus holding the fort) and it could endure through the flux of time (thus marking time). But in modern times, with respect to emancipated Judaism and with the need to be extricated from diaspora-existence and regain sovereignty, the need for full ethnicity is clearly reasserted, for sovereignty implicates full ethnicity. Only for the Judaism that retreats from emancipation is restricted ethnicity still viable.

FINAL EVALUATION

In view of this tracing of the inner logic and the structure of what constitutes the distinctive, mainstream expression of the religious phenomenon that is Judaism, how are we to evaluate the formulations of modern Judaism surveyed above? Interestingly enough, the formulations belonging to the political-Zionist trend reflect most authentically this distinctive religious phenomenon of Judaism in its present emancipated situation in the modern world. In a way it is ironic, because these formulations professed all too often to be secular and not religious (and indeed were taken as such). But apparently their non-religious stance is in truth only a stance against the rabbinic expression of Judaism, i.e., a stance against the authentic, viable expression of Judaism when it found itself in the circumstances of diaspora-existence. Taking rabbinic Judaism as the criterion of religiousness, they may well appear secular; but vis-a-vis emancipated Judaism finding itself in the circumstances of the modern world they are, in a profound sense, authentic religious expressions of Judaism. Their great advantage is that they perceive the category of peoplehood in the sense of full ethnicity. On the other hand, the many formulations which perceived the category of peoplehood in the sense of restricted ethnicity, though in many ways reflecting authentically the distinctive religious phenomenon of Judaism, fall short of doing justice to the needs of emancipated Judaism in the modern world. They are still expressing the Judaism of diaspora-existence. In a way, they represent an inner, deep-seated contradiction —wanting to express emancipated Judaism while at the same time affirming diaspora-existence. Coupling emancipated Judaism with diasporaexistence is not really possible. Yet in expressing this impossible contradiction these formulations reflect authentically the state of mind and desire of emancipated Jewry. While falling short of reflecting authentically emancipated Judaism they nonetheless reflect authentically emancipated Jewry. Lastly, as regards the formulations in the mystical trend, they evidently express a Judaism that has a different religious structure and consequently a different inner logic than the religious structure and inner logic that we presented above as constituting what we claimed to be the distinctive religious phenomenon of Judaism. We are here, so to speak, in a different ball park altogether. The two structures differ in their very foundations, i.e., in what they conceive to be the ultimate predicament of man and commensurate with this the redemptive vocation for man. Naturally, the inner logic that would operate in the mystical trend would lead to a different understanding of the status of the category of peoplehood and the category of land in the phenomenon of Judaism. The crucial question here, of course, is which trend expresses the phenomenon of Judaism more authentically. We would want to claim that intriguing and attractive as the mystical trend is, it nonetheless does not reflect the phenomenon of Judaism in its distinctiveness; and although there is no denying (not after Scholem's work) that the mystical trend found wide-spread expression within Jewry, it was not the mainstream expression. But the case that must be made to support this contention must be left to another occasion.

The problem therefore turns on the concepts of election and covenant. If one is prepared to accept that these have not been abrogated, then it follows that the bond which links Israel to the land has to be accepted as equally still in force. And here is the rub! If Christians can admit, without being unfaithful to their own beliefs, that the Jewish people have never been released from their covenant relationship with the one true God, if post-biblical Judaism is accepted as valid — in whatever manner this Judaism wish es to interpret itself and its role — then one cannot deny equal validity to the part played by the land in the Jewish people's religious self-understanding throughout the ages, including their return to it in our own time (Charlotte Klein, "The Theological Dimensions of the State of Israel", Journal of Ecumenical Studies, Vol. X, No. 4, p. 710).

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Dr. Manfred Vogel is Professor of Modern Jewish History in the Department of Religions at Northwestern University, Evanston, U.S.A.

* We did not include, in a separate heading, the non-mystical, halakhic rabbinic literature because essentially they reflect in their substance the pre-modern, traditional understanding of mainstream Judaism. The halakhic rabbinic literature of the modern period is a continued expression of rabbinic diaspora Judaism, not of the emancipated Judaism of the modern world. The interesting aspect of halakhic, rabbinic Judaism in the modern era revolves around the question of how to relate to the Zionist program. But this is a question of strategy and policy, not of substance. To jump ahead of our story, it can be said that the halakhic, rabbinic trend clearly affirmed the centrality of the category of peoplehood and of the category of the land, indeed specifically of the land of Israel, i.e., of that geographic location that was known as Palestine. The question before this trend was whether Jewry should take action (and in this case, what action should be taken) to secure the return of Jewry to its home-land, or whether such action must be left in the hands of God so that Jewry must remain passive in its diaspora-existence awaiting patiently for the time when God will act. Both sides to this question found expression within the halakhic, rabbinic trend. Clearly, the latter view affirmed diasporaexistence and indeed it is the most viable expression among all other formulations affirming diaspora-existence in as much as it also, in essence, resisted the process of emancipation (S.R. Hirsch may be an exception but his advocacy of emancipation coupled with loyalty to halakhic, rabbinic Judaism is, in our judgment, not viable; the emancipation recommended was surface-emancipation, thus not at all reflecting the process of emancipation that was actually taking place). The former view which negated diaspora-existence was riddled with hedging and ambiguity regarding the Zionist program. This in a way is understandable, for it meant the readjustment of a religious stance, i.e., the halakhic, rabbinic stance, that was geared to diaspora-existence, to existence outside profane history, to a program, i.e., the Zionist program, that negated diaspora-existence and involved the re-entry of Jewry and Judaism into profane history — a readjustment that is, to say the least, very problematic.